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REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR? 
Aviva Abramovsky* 
This article suggests that a discussion on insurance regulation 
should include a consideration of the effect that reinsurancemay 
have on the behavior of insurers. The traditional types of 
reinsurance are reviewed, and the ability of private reinsurance 
contracts to produce insureraction is considered If reinsuranceis 
not includedin a holistic examination of thefield, its realities have 
the capacity to misdirect insurance regulatory assumptions. 
Moreover, reinsuranceworks as a source of independent and often 
unexamined contractual influence on insurer activity, and as a 
potential source of interference with regulatoryproposals. Even 
though reinsuranceis initiatedby private contract, those contracts 
have the potentialforregulatoryeffect sufficient toprovide a positive 
answer to this Essay's main query: may reinsurancecorrectly be 
termed a "silent regulator"? 
"The first principle of regulation is: Lawyers and politicians write 
rules; and markets develop ways to circumvent these rules without 
violating them."' 
*Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. The author would 
like to thank the Searle Center for its generous support of this research and for the 
author's inclusion in its symposium. The author would like to recognize the staff 
of the H. Douglas Barclay Law Library at the Syracuse University College of Law 
for their invaluable help in producing this work. 
'Allan H. Meltzer, Regulatory Overkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008 at A14. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When evaluating the efficacy of insurance regulation, the nature 
and availability of reinsurance is not often considered.2 Yet, as "the 
insurance of insurance companies''3, reinsurance should not be so quickly 
dismissed as irrelevant in the regulatory discussion.4 Just as insurance is 
often viewed as having a regulatory effect on insured industries, so too 
should reinsurance be considered as having a regulatory effect on its 
reinsureds. 
Initially, a brief discussion of the concept of regulation is 
necessary. The term "regulation" commonly evokes thoughts of 
governmental action and visions of the regulatory state. For good or ill, 
thoughts of regulation are usually linked with thoughts of state power. Yet 
such a restrictive vision of regulation is simplistic and ignores the capacity 
of private institutions to regulate the activities of large swaths of social 
actors. This ability has led to the development of a fascinating body of 
literature which examines the myriad ways private or quasi-private 
insurance can regulate private behavior. With the concept of power not 
limited to overt government action alone, insurance takes its place among 
regulators of social behaviors with surprising force and scope. Indeed, it 
has been stated that "looking at twentieth century governance, it is 
tempting to see insurance as the sleeping giant ofpower." 5 
Identifying insurance as a private regulator stems from the idea that 
insurance works as a mechanism to set social standards. Insurance is an 
2 This is not overly surprising since, as one commentator noted, "development 
of reinsurance in the United States has, for much of its history, gone largely 
unrecorded." See William Hoffmnan, FacultativeReinsuranceContractFormation, 
Documentation,andIntegration,38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 763, 777 (2002-
2003). 
3See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1996). 
4See Gary Marchitello, IgnoreReinsuranceat Your Peril,RISK MGMT. MAG., 
Dec. 2007, at 46 ("Discounting the importance of the vital role of reinsurance in 
risk spreading and how the pricing, stability and capacity of reinsurance can 
influence the viability of one's own direct insurance purchases can be a critical and 
potentially costly mismanagement."). 
5 See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING 
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 12 (2002). 
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acknowledged gatekeeper of many economic activities, from buying a 
home to driving a car to executing a complex financial transaction. Some 
of this regulatory effect results from a direct delegation of state power by 
mandating the purchase of insurance as a prerequisite to such things as 
operating a car or entering a certain business, much, however, does not. 
When insurance is purchased without governmental compulsion, the nature 
of the obligations acquired alongside the indemnity function of insurance 
can be viewed as a form of "private legislation" within the regime of 
traditional notions of liberal governance.6 
The corollary of the idea of insurance as private regulator of 
policyholders is to consider the concept of reinsurance as a source of 
private regulation of reinsured insurance companies. In effect, if insurance 
is a "sleeping giant of power", how much more so is the power of 
reinsurers to affect the behavior and choices of insurers themselves? 
Through this vantage point, the reinsurance relationship begins to emerge 
as a subject requiring careful review and analysis in the regulatory context. 
Though purely private in origin7 and function,8 reinsurance of insurance 
6Id.at 13. 
7 See 3 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: SEPARATE LINES 
OF INSURANCE, § 40.01, at 6 (2007) ("The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by 
a written contract reflecting the negotiated terms. Although reinsurance contracts 
between different cedents and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes, 
the wording of particular provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties' 
specific needs, customs and practices."). 
8 See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE § 142(d), atLAW 
1021 (4th ed. 2007) ("In many respects, the relationship between primary insurer 
and reinsurer tracks that of the original insured and the primary insurer. The 
primary insurer and reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and 
the reinsurer will have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of 
warranty, fraud, or concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer's acts 
or neglect giv e rise to the defense."). See also STEVEN PLITT,ET AL., IA COUCH 
ON INSURANCE § 9:17 (3d ed. 2008) ("Duties of good faith and fair dealing run 
between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial insured 
and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer's need to rely upon 
and not duplicate the reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling 
claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract. Accordingly, 
this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which 
may affect the subject risk. The extension of this duty of good faith is the related 
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policies is common practice of the domestic insurance industry.9 For 
reasons described below, the benefits of reinsurance to an insurer are 
manifold'0 and the likelihood that an insurer will seek reinsurance at some 
point great." Hence the function of this Essay: to determine whether 
concept that reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured's good faith decision 
to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the 'follow the settlements' doctrine."). 
9 Though reinsurance agreements may use any language the parties may 
choose to effectuate their agreements, commonly found reinsurance clauses 
abound. See BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 15.03(b), at 997 (12th ed. 2003) ("Reinsurance treaties 
may contain 'follow the fortunes,' 'errors and omissions,' 'notice,' 'arbitration,'
'claims cooperation,' 'salvage and subrogation,' 'allocation of expenses,' 'extra 
contractual obligations,' 'punitive damages' and/or 'cut through clauses.' The 
wording of these clauses in different reinsurance certificates and treaties can also 
vary substantially."). 
10 See REINSURANCE AsSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Fundamentals of Property 
and Casualty Reinsurance 4 (2009) http://www.reinsurance.org/files/ 
public/07FundamentalsandGlossaryl.pdf ("Reinsurance provides protection 
against catastrophic loss in much the same way it helps stabilize an insurer's loss 
experience. Insurers use reinsurance to protect against catastrophes in two ways. 
First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic financial loss resulting from a single 
event, such as the total fire loss of a large manufacturing plant. Second, 
reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of many smaller claims resulting 
from a single event, such as an earthquake or major hurricane, that affects many 
policyholders simultaneously. While the insurer is able to cover losses 
individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer wishes to retain."). 
11See Anna Walker, Harnessing the Free Market: Reinsurance Models for 
FDICInsurance Pricing,18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 735, 742-43 (1994-1995) 
("Reinsurance is sought by primary insurers for various reasons. From an 
economic standpoint, reinsurance permits an efficient specialization of skills. In a 
simplified world, primary insurers are small, local, and specialized; reinsurers, on 
the other hand, are well capitalized international corporations with highly 
diversified risk portfolios. Primary insurers, because of their proximity to and 
knowledge of the insured, have an advantage over reinsurers in soliciting 
customers, pricing policies, and monitoring insureds for moral hazard. Reinsurers, 
on the other hand, have advantages in raising capital and diversifying and 
managing risk, particularly the risk of a catastrophe which might bankrupt a small 
private insurer. Insurers, therefore, can trade their advantages in pricing and moral 
hazard monitoring for the greater risk-bearing capacity of the reinsurer. Primary 
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reinsurance can properly be understood as a little acknowledged and "silent 
regulator" of the insurance industry. 
To that end, Section II of this article will describe what reinsurance 
is and why insurers seek it. Section III will explore the main purposes of 
reinsurance. Section IV will review various ways reinsurance has the 
capacity to influence certain insurance industry behaviors. This will 
include a review of reinsurance's effects on reinsured's underwriting and 
claims handling practices, along with a discussion of general consumer 
protection issues. Section V will offer a conclusion. 
Before beginning that discussion, it is important to note that 
insurance is not, of course, an unregulated industry, though it is the only 
major financial industry regulated primarily at the state level. State 
regulators coordinate their efforts through the highly competent National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).12 Moreover, these state 
regulators share identifiable and reasonably identical goals in the 
performance of their duties. Among these are the promotion of competitive 
and sound insurance markets and the enforcement of insurance laws to 
assure consumers of fair treatment and protection from unfair trade 
practices 13 Throughout the course of this Essay, therefore, mention will be 
insurers also may find reinsurance necemeeting regulatory restrictions that limit 
exposure to any individual risk. By retaining only a portion of each insured risk, 
the insurer is able to insure a greater variety of risks with the same amount of 
capital, assuming that state regulators permit it to subtract reinsured risk from its 
reserve requirements."). 
12 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, http://www.naic.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2009). 
13 Insurance regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk 
containment and default. However, risk of default is not the sole purview of 
insurance regulation. Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest, 
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and 
equitable normative policies. For example, the Connection Department of 
Insurance describes its mission as follows: 
The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve 
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing 
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by 
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient manner which 
promotes a competitive and financially sound insurance market for 
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made of reinsurance's potential as a source of support or hindrance to 
insurance regulatory interests. Such review gains added importance with 
the recognition that, other than as regards some issues of solvency, the 
reinsurance industry is generally unregulated at all. 14 
II. REINSURANCE: WHAT IS IT AND WHY HAVE IT? 
At its most reductive, reinsurance is a relatively straightforward 
financial transaction by which an insurance company is indemnified for all 
or a portion of some risk by another insurer. 5 This risk transfer, just as 
with common consumer or commercial insurance policies, is effectuated by 
contract, with the reinsurance agreement mainly subject to ordinary 
contract rules and doctrine. Some practices of reinsurance contract 
interpretation are distinct from the practices used in interpreting a more 
common insurance policy, but at this juncture it is sufficient to recognize 
that reinsurance is a creature of contract. 
16 
consumers, and by enforcing the insurance laws to ensure that 
consumers are treated fairly and are protected from unfair practices. 
Connecticut Department of Insurance: Our Mission Statement (Aug. 25, 
2008), http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396. 
14 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 13 ("Since 
reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency, it safeguards the validity of 
reinsurance policies and, at the same time, maintains flexibility in the business of 
reinsurance. By focusing on the reinsurer, rather than on the reinsurance contract, 
primary insurance companies are allowed to purchase reinsurance to suit their 
particular business needs. Of course, reinsurance contracts are entered into by two 
or more insurance companies - the reinsurer(s) and the insurer(s). Recognizing 
that there are always some exceptions to the rule, the two companies are generally 
expected to be knowledgeable about the insurance business. Therefore, the 
oversight necessary in primary insurance to protect consumer interests is not 
essentialin the reinsurancebusiness.") (emphasis added). 
15 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140(a), at 1015 ("Reinsurance is essentially a 
form of insurance for insurance companies."). 
16 PLrrr, supra note 9, § 9:6. ("Although some rules of construction do not 
apply to contracts in the reinsurance context, the general rules of contract do apply 
to reinsurance contracts."). 
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A. WHAT IS REINSURANCE? 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the study of reinsurance stems 
from the particularly opaque and obscure language endemic to the 
industry. 17 Some discussion of terms is necessary. As reinsurance involves 
a minimum of two insurance companies, different terms have developed to 
identify the various parties.18 The original insurer who acquired the risk or 
liability is referred to by a variety of designations, including that of direct 
or initial insurer and sometimes, though less commonly, as the primitive 
insurer.19 However designated, once it has entered into an agreement with 
a new insurer for the purpose of reinsurance, the original insurer is 
thereafter most commonly referred to as the reinsured.20 Though that 
seems clear enough, the original insurer is frequently referred to by another 
more exotic definition, that of cedent.2' This designation stems from the 
idea that the function of reinsurance is for the original insurer to "cede" a 
certain amount of its business to the reinsurer, hence the term cedent.
22 
17 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140(a), at 1015 ("The business of reinsurance 
has developed some special terminology."). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE 
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supranote 8, § 40.01, at § 40.05 (2007) ("Reinsurance, like 
many areas ofbusiness law, has a language of its own."). 
18 See PLITT, supra note 8, § 9:2 ("There are two parties to a reinsurance 
agreement, but these parties have been bestowed with multiple names which are 
used interchangeably and are all accurate."). 
19 See GRAYDON S. STARING, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE § 1:1, at 3 (Supp. 
2008) ("The original insurer, sometimes called the direct, or initial, insurer, and 
occasionally the primitive insurer, is commonly called the reinsured or, especially 
in England, the reassured."). 
20 See OSTRAGER, supranote 10, § 15.01(c), at 992 (noting a ceding insurer or 
reinsured is "the insurer that transfers all or a portion of the risk it underwrites to a 
reinsurer."). 
21 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:1, at 3 ("The reinsured is said to cede 
business to the reinsurer, or reassurer, and is therefore also referred to as the ceding 
company or the cedent (or cedant)."). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW 
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.01 ("The insurance company purchasing 
reinsurance is called the 'ceding company' (or the 'cedent' (or 'cedant'),
'reinsured' or 'ceding insurer') because it 'cedes' or transfers part of the risk."). 
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Likewise, a reinsurer may itself seek reinsurance, called retrocessions, in 
the same forms and for the same purposes as any other insurers.23 Hence, 
the reinsurer of a reinsurer is often called a retrocessionaire.24 
As a descriptive matter, reinsurance is inherently a contract of 
insurance, albeit a secondary one.25 Reinsurance is commonly defined as a 
contract "by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against 
loss or liability by reason of such original insurance., 26 More generally, 
22 See JERRY, supranote 9, § 140[a], at 1054 ("The act of transferring the risk 
is called 'ceding,' and the portion of the risk passed to the reinsurer is called the 
'cession."'). 
23 See PLITT,supranote 9, § 9:3 (The retrocessional agreement, like any other 
reinsurance agreement, is a contract and will be effective according to its terms. 
These terms need not mirror the specific risks of the reinsurance agreement which 
it is reinsuring. As can quickly be deduced, with the expansion of the insuring 
scenario from one to three or more separate agreements, all of which may cover 
different risks and have different exclusions, the resolution of indemnity 
responsibility can easily become complex). 
24 The preponderance of French terminology likely arises from the early 
statutory action by the French Courts in the reinsurance business. For instance, 
notice ofthe 1681 Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV provided that: 
The insurers may reinsure with others the effects they may have insured, and 
the insured may likewise cause to be insured the premium of insurance, and the 
solvency of the insurers. 
STARING, supra note 20,§ 1:4, at 6 (providing translation of Article XX, Title 
Sixth of the 1681 Ordonnance). 
25 PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:1 ("Reinsurance is a contract whereby one insurer 
transfers or 'cedes' to another insurer all or part of the risk it has assumed under a 
separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a portion of the 
premium ...While reinsurance technically qualifies as insurance, it is a contract 
for indemnity rather than liability."). 
26 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:1, at 2 (This definition allows for the 
inclusion of both an existing policy or contract of reinsurance and assumes that the 
requirements of the contract are met. A "reinsurance policy" can therefore simply 
be understood as a "contract for indemnity one insurer makes with another to 
protect the insurer from risks already assumed." Likewise a treaty looking forward 
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reinsurance includes all contractual arrangements where one insurance 
company transfers to another all or some portion of the risk it underwrites 
to another insurer.27 Thus, the common refrain that reinsurance is 
insurance for insurance companies.2 s 
One of the hardships in understanding reinsurance is that the term 
is sometimes used over-broadly and applied to relationships which are best 
understood as something other than a commonly accepted definition of 
reinsurance. 29  Reinsurance is best understood as distinct from co-
to reinsure would constitute reinsurance, though such agreement may be better 
understood as a contract for reinsurance, rather than a contract of reinsurance. In 
either case, reinsurance policies, reinsurance treaties on specific classes of risk and 
reinsurance treaties entered into for future acquired risk would all come within the 
heading of reinsurance); OSTRAGER &NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 15.01, at 990. 
27 See Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 491 U.S. 244 (1989); OSTRAGER 
&NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 15.01[a], at 990. 
28 See Cont'l Cas v. Stronghold Ins. Co., Ltd., et al., 77 F.3d 16, 17, 20 (2d 
Cir. 1996). In that case, the Second Circuit offered an additional colorful and 
intuitive explanation of reinsurance adopted in a New York Court of Appeals 
decision of the late 1930's. See id.at 17. (discussing People ex. rel. Sea Ins. Co. v. 
Graves, 274 N.Y. 312, 15 (1937)) (The concept of reinsurance "dates back to the 
time the first bookie, fearful that he could not cover all his bets in the event he 
were to lose, decided to spread his risk 'laying-off" the risk by getting other 
bookies to share his exposure."). Though colorful, that assessment is not entirely 
accurate. The earliest recordings of the use of reinsurance likely predated the 
iteration of the modem bookie and has been historically identified as predating the 
t17h century. See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4, at 5-6 ("The earliest recorded 
instance is said to have been a policy written on a voyage from Genoa to Sluys and 
reinsured for the more hazardous portion, from Cardiz to Sluys, the insurer 
retaining the Mediterranean portion of the risk."). The New York courts were not 
altogether mistaken as England likely recognized the relationship between 
insurance and speculation in the 18 th Century and prohibited marine reinsurance by 
the Marine Act of 1745. Addressing that Parliamentary Act, Lord Mansfield noted 
that, "The statute doubtless was intended to prevent gambling. I suppose that the 
mischief was that policies were underwritten at one premium and reassurance 
affected at another." In Re Norwich Equitable Fire Assurance Soc'y 57 LT REP. 
241, 243 (1887). 
29 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1053 ("Reinsurance should not be 
confused with the situation where one insured takes out two or more policies 
covering the same risk with two or more insurers. Also, reinsurance should not be 
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insurance, the proper term for the relationship which forms when separate 
insurers, either jointly or severally, assume direct shares of a given risk; in 
such cases where all the insurers have a direct relationship with the insured, 
the relationship is not within the traditional understanding of reinsurance.30 
Likewise, reinsurance should be distinguished from banking even though it 
may assist in the reinsured's financing and allow for insurance loss 
amortization.31 
In a true reinsurance contract, the risk indemnified is the risk that 
the insurer will have to pay on the underlying insured risk.32 Reinsurance 
is an aspect of insurance and, to the extent that it is regulated at all, is 
regulated under the rubric of insurance. By entering into a contract to 
reinsure, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer for any 
liability incurred by the insurer that is covered by the reinsurance 
confused with the situation where the insured cancels one policy and substitutes 
another for it . . .Reinsurance only exists where a primary insurer becomes a 
'reinsured' by entering into a contract with another insurer, the 'reinsurer."'). 
30 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:5, at 9-10 ("Reinsurance is not 
coinsurance, which is the relationship that results when separate insurers, either 
severally or jointly, assume direct shares of a given risk; in that case, all the 
insurers have a direct contract with the insured. It also is not a partnership, co-
venture, or syndication, even though the contract may contain clauses creating or 
permitting joint responsibilities or control, as well as joint loss, since true 
reinsurance lacks essential characteristics of those relationships."). 
31Id.at 10 ("Neither is reinsurance banking, although it performs a function of 
banking by providing the amortization of insurance losses and may, in effect, 
finance the growth of the reinsured."). 
32 Risk is transferred by a variety of financial transactions, not all, or even 
most of which, constitute insurance. Though insurance itself remains a somewhat 
elusive definitional concept, the indemnity function, particularly when combined 
with some aspect of fortuity is often seen as core insurance principles. See PLITT, 
supra note 9, § 9:24. ("Because the reinsurance agreement is a contract of 
indemnity, the liability of the reinsurer is inextricably tied to the loss of the 
reinsured."); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01 [a], at 990; Travelers 
Idem. Co. v. Scor Reins. Co., 62 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1995) (Reinsurance is 
generally understood as a contract for indemnity not one of liability); Transcont'l 
Underwriters Agency v. Am. Agency Underwriters, 680 F.2d 298, 299 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
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agreement.33 Importantly for our later discussions, the liabilities covered 
under a reinsuring agreement can extend beyond the cost of direct losses 
accrued by the cedent insurer's policyholder under the original policy to 
include such things as the cedent's costs of investigation and settlement of 
claims.34 Examples of other potentially indemnified insurer losses can 
even include losses arising from the reinsured's own bad faith - such as 
"judgments in excess of loss" costs and extracontractual, tortious bad faith
35 
liability. 
B. A BRIEF TAXONOMY OF REINSURANCE 
As reinsurance is a contractual arrangement, the nature, complexity 
and terms of many contracts stray from the standardization common among 
primary insurance policies.3 6 In fact, because of reinsurance's remarkable 
flexibility and its capacity to take on a large variety of risk types and risk 
levels, the policies vary in their purposes and specifics.37 The terms of the 
reinsurance contract and the terms of the policies reinsured determines the 
scope of the indemnity offered by the reinsurer.38 The contracts reflect the 
business needs of sophisticated commercial entities and, as such, the terms, 
33 PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:24 ("It is the language of the reinsurance contract 
that will ultimately determine the extent of the reinsurer's liability to the reinsured. 
In other words, the sustaining of a loss by the original insured cannot create 
liability for the reinsurer extending beyond the terms of its contract"). See also 
STARING, supra note 20, § 15:1, at 1 ("It does not necessarily follow that, where 
the first insurer is liable, the reinsurer is also liable. Whether or not the reinsurer is 
liable depends upon the terms of the contract of reinsurance."). 
34 See PLrrr,supranote 9, § 9:30. 
35See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 16.06[a], at 1045-1048. 
36 See id. § 15.03[b], at 997 ("Reinsurance treaties and certificates vary 
considerably in their language and terms ofcoverage"). 
37 Id. ("Reinsurance treaties may contain 'follow the fortunes,' 'errors and 
omissions,' 'notice,' 'arbitration,' 'claims cooperation,' 'salvage and subrogation,'
'allocation of expenses,' 'extra contractual obligations,' 'punitive damages' and/or
'cut through clauses.' The wording of these clauses in different reinsurance 
certificates and treaties can also vary substantially.").
38 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993). 
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conditions and costs of a reinsurance contract are all negotiable.39 Various 
° clauses such as "follow the forms" and "follow the settlements' , or 
clauses for "extracontractual damages '' 1, all discussed later in further 
detail, are common to many reinsurance contracts. The interaction of 
various clauses and the reciprocal obligations of good faith will be 
discussed in Section TV as we review the performance standards required 
by the reinsurance agreement. First, in order to understand the purposes of 
reinsurance, we review a few of the common types of arrangements 
common to those agreements. 42 
39 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 
40.01 ("The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by a written contract reflecting 
the negotiated terms. Although reinsurance contracts between different cedents 
and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes, the wording of particular 
provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties' specific needs, customs 
and practices."). 
40 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 31 (noting 
"'follow the settlements' generally provides that a reinsurer must cover settlements 
made by the reinsured in a business like manner, provided the settlement is 
arguably within the terms of the reinsured's policy and the reinsurance agreement 
and the settlement is not affected by fraud, collusion or bad faith. It is an 
expectation that the reinsurer will abide by the reinsured's good faith determination 
to settle, rather than litigate, claims under a reinsured policy and not relitigate a 
reinsured's settlements ceded to the reinsurance agreement. The term is often used 
interchangeably with follow the fortunes, and there may be overlap between the 
affect of follow the settlements and follow the fortunes when the 'risk' is what 
generated the loss. Follow the settlements is focused on 'loss settlement', not 
necessarily tied to a 'risk determination' arising out of follow the fortunes."). 
41 Id. at 29 (noting the definition of the term extra-contractual obligations as 
"in reinsurance, monetary awards or settlements against an insurer for its alleged 
wrongful conduct to its insured. Such payments required of an insurer to its 
insured are extra-contractual in that they are not covered in the underlying 
contract."). 
42 See PLITr, supra note 9, § 9:3 ("There are two broad categories of 
reinsurance agreements: facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance."). 
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i. FacultativeReinsurance 
Facultative reinsurance is the most discrete form of reinsurance, 
and generally accepted as the likely original form of reinsurance.43 
Facultative reinsurance policies take their name because the contracts allow 
the reinsurance company to use its "faculties" or reason to choose to 
reinsure a specific risk, a specific policy, or a specific group of policies. 
4 
The ceding insurer and reinsurer agree to the terms and conditions of each 
individual contract.45 In these contracts, the reinsurer often conducts its 
own underwriting to determine the appropriate premium level.46 
Facultative reinsurance contracts provide reinsurance for the unusual; they 
also have the greatest specific effect on the cost of covering unusual or 
43 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 ("Facultative reinsurance of a single risk, 
which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the last half of 
the Nineteenth Century. A treaty, which is a long term contract covering more 
than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821. Treaties became common 
around the beginning of the Twentieth Century and one form, the excess of loss 
treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San Francisco 
earthquake and fire of 1906"). 
44 See JERRY supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054 ("Facultative reinsurance 
involves the primary insurer entering into an agreement for the reinsurance of a 
particular risk. The reinsurance can be written on a pro rata or an excess basis; the 
root word "faculty" denotes that the reinsurer has a choice of accepting or rejecting 
any risk proposed and of demanding whatever premium it thinks appropriate."). 
45 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at § 
40.04[1] ("The reinsurer and cedent negotiate the terms for each facultative 
certificate."). See also STARING, supra note 20, at §2:2 ("The prospective 
reinsured, either directly or through a broker, presents the direct policy terms, or a 
summary of them, and the proposal for reinsurance. If it is accepted at a 
satisfactory premium, a contract is made. Other terms are negotiated to the 
satisfaction ofboth parties."). 
46 See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6 ("The reinsurer will always have at least 
a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured's underwriting 
and claims practices."). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE 
GUIDE, supranote 8, § 40.04[1] ("Facultative reinsurance is commonly purchased 
for large, unusual or catastrophic risks. Reinsurers thus must have the necessary 
resources to underwrite individual risks carefully."). 
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low-incidence risks.47 Likewise, with its ability to allow reinsurers to 
engage in significant underwriting operations prior to placing the policy, 
facultative reinsurance is often used to cover catastrophic or other low 
incidence - high loss risks.48 Individual risk facultative reinsurance may be 
used in
49 
tandem with the second variety of reinsuring agreements, the 
treaty. 
ii. Treaty Reinsurance 
Treaties are broad agreements that reinsure multiple contracts, 
often contracts that have yet to be written by the direct insurer.50  Usually, 
treaties cover some portion or class of business of the direct insurer and 
historically may cover a long period of time, usually renewable on a fairly 
automatic basis unless one of the parties seeks a new term.5' Treaties are 
47 See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:3, at 4 ("Once, no doubt, all reinsurance 
was facultative. With the rise of treaties, they account for great amounts of 
reinsurance but facultative reinsurance, which requires individual attention to 
underwriting, remains very important for businesses that fall outside the bounds of 
a treaty reinsurance program. The reinsured may want to meet competition and 
enter into new lines in which it has no expertise but can gain it through initially 
taking risks and obtaining facultative reinsurance from those who have experience. 
The reinsured may need facultative reinsurance where the risk falls under an 
exclusion in its treaties, either as to type or amount, or because the risk, although 
routine in nature, present a very high loss exposure. In the end, all these uses serve 
the general purpose of reinsurance to provide stability and promote growth."). 
48 See OSTRAGER &NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 15.01[b] ("The availability of 
reinsurance enables an insurer to accept risks that would otherwise be beyond its 
underwriting capacity by allowing the ceding insurer to 'lay-off on reinsurers a 
portion of the risk of loss. Thus, reinsurance enables insurers to spread the risk of 
catastrophic losses among a larger pool of insurers."). 
49 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, supra note 8, at § 
40.04[l]. 
50 JERRY supranote 9, § 140[b], at 1054. 
51 Id. ("Most reinsurance is treaty reinsurance. The treaty arrangement, 
sometimes called "automatic reinsurance," involves a commitment of a reinsurer to 
assume part of the risk of the primary insurer, either on a pro rata or an excess 
basis, for a stated period."). 
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particularly useful reinsuring mechanisms since they can be structured to 
reinsure losses on direct insurance which either were written during the 
term of the treaty but occur later, or they can be structured to reinsure 
losses that occur during the term of treaty but were written earlier.
52 
Likewise, the premiums may be calculated in a variety of ways including 
structuring the reinsurance premium in some way directly related to the 
premiums on the underlying policies or assigning a single sum or some 
other variable amount as the parties wish and which reflect their business 
purposes.53 Generally speaking, the treaty reinsurance contract forms when 
the original insurer cedes part of the premiums for its policies and the risk 
of losses on those policies to the reinsurer.54 Treaty reinsurance usually 
involves multiple reinsurers taking part of a book of the business' risks, 
with each
55 
agreeing to assume a portion of the risk in some pre-determined 
manner. 
Importantly, reinsurance treaties cover all risks written by the 
reinsured that fall within their terms unless specifically excluded.56 For this 
reason, treaty reinsurers generally do not review the individual risks 
underlying the treaty and do not conduct their own underwriting of the 
52 See STARING, supranote 20, § 2:4, at 4-5. 
53 Id. at 5 ("Depending again on its structure and purpose, the premiums may 
be directly related to the premiums on the underlying insurance or may be lump 
sums, or variable amounts, not based on direct participation in the underlying 
premiums."). 
54 OSTRAGER &NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.03[a], at 996. ("The reinsurer, 
under a single contract, agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer with respect to an 
entire 'book' of the ceding insurer's underwriting activities for designated lines of 
insurance. A treaty reinsurance contract is formed when the primary insurer cedes 
part of the premiums for its policies and the losses on those policies to a 
reinsurer."). 
55 Id. ("Arrangements typically involve the participation of numerous 
reinsurers, each agreeing to assume a percentage of the total liability under a single 
treaty."). 
56 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 
40.04, at 17. ("Reinsurance treaties cover all of the risks written by the ceding 
insurer that fall within their terms unless exposures are specifically excluded. 
Thus, in most cases, neither the cedent nor the reinsurer has the 'faculty' to 
exclude from a treaty a risk that fits within the treaty terms."). 
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risks. Rather, they rely on the underwriting experience of the original 
insurer, with a prudent reinsurer investigating the underwriting philosophy, 
loss experience, attitude towards claims management and other business 
practices.58  Facultative reinsurance can be combined with treaty 
reinsurance to cover exclusions in the treaty or for other business purposes, 
some of which we explore later.59 
iii. The Verticals and Horizontals of Reinsurance: Pro-
rataandExcess ofLoss 
Again, we recognize along with the United States Supreme Court 
that: 
In indemnity reinsurance . . . [the reinsurer] agrees to 
indemnify, or reimburse, the ceding company for a 
specified percentage of the claims and expenses 
attributable to claims that have been reinsured.6° 
57Id. ("Treaty reinsurers rely heavily on the cedent's underwriting."). 
58 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 7. ("While 
treaty reinsurance does not require review of individual risks by the reinsurer, it 
demands a careful review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and historical 
experience of the ceding insurer, including a thoughtful evaluation of the 
company's attitude toward claims management, engineering control, as well as the 
management's general background, expertise and planned objectives."). 
59 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 29, 54. 
(Noting the definition of treaty reinsurance is "is a reinsurance contract under 
which the reinsured company agrees to cede and the reinsurer agrees to assume 
risks of a particular class or classes of businesses" and the definition of facultative 
reinsurance is "reinsurance of individual risks by offer and acceptance wherein the 
reinsurer retains the ability to accept or reject each risk offered by the ceding 
company."). 
60 Colonial American Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 491 U.S. 244, 247 (1989). See 
also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993). 
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The insured's indemnification by the reinsured need not be total or 
complete.6' In fact, the ability of reinsurers to take only a portion of a risk 
or book of risks is one of the particularly useful risk spreading-elements of 
reinsurance.62 There is nothing to prevent a single reinsurer from taking all 
indemnity responsibility for a policy or group of policies, but most 
reinsuring agreements take responsibility for only a portion of those 
losses.63 Traditionally, the responsibilities divide into two basic divisional 
structures most easily visualized as either a vertical or horizontal slicing up 
61 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1 
("Reinsurance is a transaction in which one insurance company indemnifies, for a 
premium, another insurance company against all or part of the loss that it may 
sustain under its policy or policies of insurance"). 
62 Id. ("The fundamental objective of insurance, to spread the risk so that no 
single entity finds itself saddled with a financial burden beyond its ability to pay, is 
enhanced by reinsurance."). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE 
GUIDE, supra note 8 ("Reinsurance relationships can be simple or complex. A 
cedent can cede certain loss exposures under one contract or purchase several 
contracts covering different aspects or portions of the same policy to achieve the 
desired degree of coverage. A layering process involving two or more reinsurance 
agreements is commonly employed to obtain sufficient monetary limits of 
reinsurance protection. When a claim is presented, the reinsurers respond in a 
predetermined order to cover the loss."). 
63 See PLITr, supranote 9, § 9:1, at 3-4 ("Reinsurance is a contract whereby 
one insurer transfers or 'cedes' to another insurer all or part of the risk it has 
assumed under a separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a 
portion of the premium."). 
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of the losses from particular risks assumed.64 Both facultative and treaty 
reinsurance can be written in either a pro-rata or excess of loss basis. 
65 
C. PRO-RATA AND EXCESS OF Loss 
If a reinsurer does not want indemnification responsibility for an 
entire risk classification or group of policies, it can structure the treaty to 
take on only a specific portion of each risk to which it applies.66 Using a 
pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding 
insurer for a percentage of original risk losses in exchange for a 
corresponding portion of the premium. 67 Generally, pro-rata agreements 
64 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1 
("Reinsurance may be written on either a proportional basis or excess of loss basis. 
A reinsurance contract written on a proportional basis simply prorates all 
premiums, losses and expenses between the insurer and the reinsurer on a pre-
arranged basis. The proportional approach is used extensively in property 
reinsurance. Excess of loss contracts, on the other hand, require the primary 
insurer to keep all losses up to a predetermined level of retention, and the reinsurer 
to reimburse the company for any losses above that level of retention, up to the 
limits of the reinsurance contract. In simplest terms, a retention is analogous to the 
deductible a policyholder may have on a personal insurance policy, such as an 
automobile or homeowner's policy."). 
65 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, §15.03[a], at 996 ("Both treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance can be written on either a pro-rata or 
excess-of-loss basis. Treaty reinsurance involves an ongoing agreement between 
two insurers, binding in advance one to cede and the other to accept specified 
business that is the subject of the treaty. Facultative reinsurance is negotiated with 
respect to a specific risk insured by a particular policy or policies."). See also 
REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 7.. 
' See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 10 ("Under 
proportional reinsurance, the ceding insurer and the reinsurer automatically share 
all premiums and losses covered by the contract on a pre-agreed basis, thus there 
are no characteristics uniquely attributable to the risk associated with proportional 
reinsurance."). 
67 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 ("Pursuant to 
a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer 
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding 
portion of the premium for the original risk."). 
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obligate the reinsurer to indemnify an insurer without requiring any 
retention by the reinsured.68 Commonly, this type of pro-rata arrangement 
is called Quota Share Reinsurance, where the ceding company indemnifies 
the cedent insurer for a fixed percentage of loss on all policies of a defined 
risk type.69 This easily visualized apportionment can become somewhat 
more complex in that a "pro-rata" treaty can also be horizontally segmented 
within each "slice" by requiring the ceding insurer to retain some portion of 
the loss with the reinsurer only responsible for the surplus. 70 This type of 
pro-rata reinsuring up to the amount of insurance originally written, minus 
the ceding insurer's retention is commonly called Surplus Share 
Reinsurance.71 With the entrance of additional retrocessionaires there can 
be quite a bit of segmentation in this surplus line. 
68 See Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 299 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Wis. 1981); Central 
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage Corp., 426 F. Supp. 7, 11 n. 5, 21 (D. Neb. 
1976), aff'd in part and remanded, 565 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1977). See also 
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 ("Pro-rata reinsurance 
arrangements generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that 
occur with no retention by the reinsured."). 
69 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054-1055 ("Pro rata reinsurance, 
sometimes called 'quota share' reinsurance, means that losses, premiums, and 
expenses are divided pro rata by the primary insurer and the reinsurer. For 
example, the primary insurer may retain sixty percent of the risk and transfer forty 
percent. If any loss occurs, whether large or small, the primary insurer is liable for 
sixty percent of the loss and the reinsurer is liable for forty percent."). See also 
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting quota share 
reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of loss for all 
policies of a defined type written by the ceding company."). 
70 JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b] at 1055. ("A special kind of pro rata 
reinsurance is 'surplus reinsurance.' Under surplus reinsurance, the reinsurer 
agrees to cover a share of the risk that varies with the size of the exposure. For 
example, the treaty might specify that losses under $50,000 are covered in full by 
the primary insurer, that the first $50,000 of losses between $50,000 and $250,000 
is paid by the direct insurer and the rest by the reinsurer, and that losses exceeding 
$250,000 are paid 20 percent by the direct insurer and 80 percent by the 
reinsurer."). 
71 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting 
surplus share reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of 
loss for all policies of a defined type written by the ceding company."). 
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Another interesting aspect of pro-rata treaties is the reinsured's 
obligation to automatically accept its portion of the risks insured.72 Pro-
rata treaties come in a variety of broad types, knowledge of each of which 
is useful for our later discussion. For instance, the treaty can be pro-rata 
and obligatory.73 Through this structure, all risks in a specified category 
are shared automatically by some proportion agreed to.74 Pro-rata treaties 
often allocate a portion of the original premium to the reinsurer.75 
In the excess of loss reinsurance scenario, the reinsurer's obligation 
is defined in relation to the reinsured's retention.76 In this structure the 
reinsurer, subject to specific stated limits of coverage, indemnifies the 
reinsured for all or a stated portion of losses in excess of the agreed upon 
retention. 77 The agreements can be structured so that the reinsurance can 
72 See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 
40.04[2], at 16 ("Proportional or pro-rata reinsurance is characterized by a 
proportional division of liability and premium between the ceding company and 
the reinsurer."). 
73 Id. ("The cedent pays the reinsurer a predetermined share of the premium, 
and the reinsurer indemnifies the cedent for a like share of the loss and the expense 
incurred by the cedent in its defense and settlement of claims (the 'allocated loss 
adjustment expense' or 'LAE'). 
74 Id. ("According to the percentage agreed, the cedent and reinsurer share the 
premium and losses from the business reinsured."). 
75 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 ("Pursuant to 
a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer 
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding 
portion of the premium for the original risk. Pro-rata reinsurance arrangements 
generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that occur with no 
retention by the reinsured."). 
76 See STARING, supra note 20, at 4 ("Whether the contract is pro rata or 
excess, the reinsured will.. .be expected ordinarily to retain a sufficient amount of 
the risk to give the reinsurer confidence that the policy will be well 
administered."). 
77 See Compagnie de Reassurance d'Ile de France v. New England 
Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp. 986, 998 n.17 (D. Mass. 1996). 
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be excess to the specific risk, specific occurrence, an aggregate dollar 
amount or specified loss ratio.78 
Ill. PURPOSES OF REINSURANCE 
A comprehensive review of all the reasons an insurer may seek to 
reinsure is not possible or necessary for the purposes of this Essay. Suffice 
it to say that as reinsurance is a flexible medium and supports a variety of 
functions, the purpose of acquiring it will differ in accordance with the 
it.79  business interests of the insurer seeking Likewise, as reinsurance 
serves a variety of purely financial and accounting purposes, reinsurance 
may be employed for purposes slightly beyond the scope of this Essay's 
interest in its potential regulatory effects on insurance companies as 
insuring companies, rather than as financial institutions. Regardless, in 
accordance with our focus on the potential effects of reinsurance on 
primary insurers, it is useful to review the four main purposes for which 
reinsurance is generally sought in relation to the primary insurer's 
insurance function.
80 
78 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, § 15.02[b], at 994 (noting per risk or specific excess 
reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the 
amount of loss in excess of a specified retention with respect to each risk covered 
by a reinsurance arrangement"; per occurrence reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding 
insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the amount of loss in excess of a 
specified retention with respect to each occurrence"; aggregate excess of loss 
reinsurance "indemnifies the ceding insurer for the amount by which the ceding 
insurer's loss during a specified period exceeds either (a) a specific dollar amount 
or (b) a percentage of the company's subject premium"; and stop loss reinsurance 
"indemnifies the ceding insurer for losses in excess of a specified loss ratio up to a 
predetermined loss ratio limit."). 
79 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 
("Depending on the ceding company's goals, different types of reinsurance 
contracts are available to bring about the desired result."). 
80 Id. (Insurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit 
liability on specific risks; (2) to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against 
catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity."). 
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A. RISK ALLOCATION 
For some purposes, reinsurance serves the almost identical purpose 
for the reinsured insurance company as that of many other common 
commercial insurances. Thus, reinsurance's initial purpose may be viewed 
as a basic reallocation of risk and as an additional way to spread risk.81 Just 
as any commercial entity might enter the insurance market seeking 
indemnity for specific types of loss, so too does the insurer seek a 
mechanism to transfer the risk it chose to underwrite to another party. 2 In 
a reinsurance situation, the risk acquired by the ceding insurer transfers to 
the reinsurer to the extent and within the limits of the negotiated contract; 
to the extent that those risks are allocated among numerous reinsurers, the 
risk is spread even further.83 
This risk transfer benefits the insurer by allowing the reinsured to 
take action that might otherwise be prohibited or disallowed sans 
reinsurance.84 For instance, through the medium of reinsurance, the ceding 
81 Id. ("By providing a mechanism through which insurers limit their loss 
exposure to levels commensurate with their net assets, reinsurance enables 
insurance companies to offer coverage limits considerably higher than they could 
otherwise provide."). 
82 Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcora (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 590 N.E.2d 1186, 
1188 (1992). 
83 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 6. Importantly, 
it must be remembered that reinsurance does not actually lessen total risk 
exposure: 
In any discussion of reinsurance, the limitations must be 
considered along with its advantages. Reinsurance does not 
change the inherent nature of a risk being insured. It cannot make 
a bad risk insurable or an exposure more predictable or desirable. 
And while reinsurance may limit an insurance company's exposure 
to a risk, the total risk exposure is not altered through the use of 
reinsurance. 
Id. 
84 JERRY, supra note 9, § 141, at 1056 ("[R]einsurance permits an insurer to 
transfer large risks that it is unable to manage or that are simply too risky to 
another insurer."). 
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insurer can underwrite business that it might otherwise not have been able 
to undertake.8 5 Either the risk itself may simply be too large or the risk of 
loss might be unusual in some other way.86 By limiting their loss exposure 
through reinsurance, the reinsured can offer higher coverage limits than 
they could otherwise afford. 7 Through this mechanism, smaller insurers 
have the capacity to compete with larger companies and offer their 
policyholders a broader array of coverage options.88 
Likewise, the insurer may want to enter business lines that present 
the possibility of some future unexpected losses the insurer is unwilling to 
retain beyond a specific retention.8 9 Either the possibility of a very great a 
85 Id. ("For example, an insurer that has a portfolio of coverage faces the risk 
that a large number of small losses of an unexpected, unexceptional nature may 
occur, thereby exceeding the insurer's capacity to pay for them without suffering a 
loss."). 
86 Id. ("[Tihe insurer faces the risk that a single catastrophic event, the precise 
timing of which is uncertain (e.g., an earthquake) may occur with devastating 
consequences to the insurer's balance sheet."). 
87 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 ("In 
calculating an appropriate level of reinsurance, a company takes into account the 
amounts of its own available surplus, and determines its level of retention based on 
the amount of loss it can absorb financially. Surplus, sometimes referred to as 
policyholders' surplus, is the amount by which the assets of an insurer exceed its 
liabilities. A company's retention may range anywhere from a few thousand 
dollars to one million dollars or more. The loss exposure above the retention, up to 
the policy limits of the reinsurance contract, is indemnified by the reinsurer. In 
this manner, reinsurance helps to stabilize loss experience on individual risks, as 
well as on accumulated losses under many policies occurring during a specified 
period."). 
88 Id. (noting reinsurance's goal of limiting liability "is crucial because it 
allows all companies, large and small, to offer coverage limits to meet their 
policyholders' needs. In this manner, reinsurance provides an avenue for small-to-
medium size companies to compete with industry giants."). 
89 JERRY, supra note 9, at § 141, at 1056-57 ("Just as reinsurance enables an 
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer 
to leave a particular kind of business quickly. An insurer that wants to rid itself of 
a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the 
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and 
makes the reinsurer the insurer for all ofthe risks."). 
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number of small, unexpected losses or the possibility of a single, 
catastrophic loss which could overwhelm the insurer's balance sheet might 
cause a prudent insurer to acquire reinsurance to offset the risk of loss.90 
This prudential risk-transferring purpose of reinsurance appropriately 
supports a decision to reinsure, even though the insurer believes (as it must) 
that its underwriting decisions are prudent and the premium appropriate. 
After all, sufficiently imprudent underwriting could well be a defense to 
reinsurance coverage. 9' Still, even the most perspicacious of underwriters 
cannot foresee the unexpected; thus the prudential purpose of reinsurance. 
90 Id.at 1056 ("When the primary insurer purchases reinsurance, it reduces the 
size of its potential losses, which reduces the size of the reserves it must maintain. 
Insurers, however, are not as interested in reducing reserves as they are in 
increasing their business. An insurer with the minimum allowable level of reserves 
and surplus (the amount an insurer is required to maintain in excess of reserves to 
meet unexpected losses) could not take on new business or enter new fields. 
However, reinsurance provides a solution: the insurer could write the coverage, 
transfer the risk to a reinsurer, and receive a commission from the reinsurer. The 
primary insurer adds no new liabilities, but its surplus increases by the amount of 
the commission. This increased surplus enables the primary insurer to write and 
retain additional coverage. Another way to view this transaction is that some of 
the excess capacity of the reinsurer is utilized by the business-garnering efforts of 
the primary insurer; in essence some excess capacity is transferred from the 
reinsurer to the primary insurer. For the small insurer who wants to grow, 
reinsurance is an important way to take on new business beyond its means and 
simultaneously increase its capacity."). 
91 PLITT, supra note 9, at § 9:31, 80-1 ("The duty of good faith that runs 
between the parties to a reinsurance contract is essential to the reinsurance 
relationship. Stemming from the reinsurer's need to rely upon and not duplicate the 
reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling claims, and reducing 
costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract. Due to these specific needs of the 
industry, the duty of utmost good faith in this context connotes a higher duty than 
the ordinary duty of good faith that is inherent in general contract law. 
Accordingly, it requires that the reinsured must disclose to the reinsurer all 
material facts which may affect the subject risk. The failure of a reinsured to 
disclose material facts to the reinsurer will warrant the rescission of a reinsurance 
contract."). 
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B. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
A second purpose for reinsurance, one particularly importantly in 
the insurance regulatory context, is using reinsurance to reduce the amount 
of reserves an insurer must maintain, thus freeing the insurer up to write 
more policies.92 In purchasing reinsurance, the primary insurer reduces the 
size of its potential losses, which allows it to reduce its statutorily 
mandated reserves. 93 Hence, if a primary insurer hits the threshold for the 
minimum allowable level of reserves plus surplus that it is statutorily 
required to maintain, the amount of new business open to it would be 
restricted. But, if the primary insurer purchased reinsurance, the primary 
would still be able to write new policies so long as it could transfer the risk 
to the reinsurer.94 In fact, since the reinsurer swaps the new risk in 
exchange for a commission, the primary insurer is frequently seen as 
acquiring no new liabilities, while its surplus is viewed as increasing by the 
amount of the reinsurer's commission.9 5 The majority of public regulation 
governing reinsurers concerns itself with this aspect of the reinsuring 
relationship.9 6 
92 See Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcoran (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 79 N.Y.2d 
255, 258 (1992) (noting reinsurance allows "a primary insurer to reduce the 
amount of legally required reserves held for the protection of policyholders, and to 
increase the company's ability to underwrite other policies or make other 
investments"). 
93 See STARING, supra note 20 ("For the individual insurer, the purchase of 
reinsurance has any or all of a number of objectives. It will desire to limit the 
reserves it must maintain for losses on its ordinary business."). 
94 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 4-5 ("When an 
insurance company issues a policy, the expenses associated with issuing that 
policy, such as taxes, agent commissions, and administrative expenses, are charged 
immediately against the company's income, resulting in a decrease in surplus. 
Meanwhile, the premium collected must be set aside in an unearned premium 
reserve to be recognized as income over a period of time. This accounting 
procedure allows for strong solvency regulation; however, it ultimately leads to 
decreased capacity. As an insurance company sells more policies, it must pay 
more expenses from its surplus. Therefore, the company's ability to write 
additional business is reduced."). 
95 Id. ("Insurers purchase reinsurance... to increase capacity."). 
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i. Regulationof Reinsurancefor PurposesofSolvency 
Though by no means its sole purpose, much insurance regulation 
exists simply to decrease the likelihood of unexpected insurance company 
failure. Regulators typically identify the fiscal ramifications of wide-scale 
insurance failure as their justification for proper insurance regulation. 
Therefore, though permitting reinsurers to go unregulated in other aspects, 
regulators recognized that the potential insolvency of a reinsurer could 
affect the solvency of its reinsureds, and have therefore taken legislative 
action to minimize that risk. 
This is no idle matter. Both the Transit Casualty Company and 
Mission Insurance Company failed due to insurance insolvency in the 
1980'S. 97 The failure occurred in part because they could not collect from 
their reinsurers. To address this risk, the states all have various techniques 
in place to assure reinsurer solvency. If admitted or licensed in the state, 
the reinsurer must comport with certain reserve requirements of its own or, 
if foreign or unadmitted, states require the reinsurer to offer a bond 
sufficient to allay fears of not collecting on reinsurance agreements. 98 If 
the company does not post a bond, the insurer cannot take advantage of 
reinsurance's ability to grant credit and expand reserves. 
96 Since reserves are the primary way public regulators attempt to reduce the 
risk of insurer insolvency and default, a great amount of activity has occurred 
amongst and between regulators to devise statutory schemes that allow for 
protection of the reserves. See, e.g., INVESTMENTS OF INSURERS MODEL ACT § 22 
(NAIC 2007). There has been some very interesting work on reinsurer chartering 
and on bonding requirements for foreign insurers reinsuring domestic primaries. 
97 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Insurance Regulation: State Reinsurance 
Oversight Increased, but Problems Remain 8 (1990). [Hereinafter 1990 GAO 
Report]. 
98 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 ("When 
overriding public policy concerns require regulatory involvement, however, nearly 
all states have adopted regulations affecting reinsurance contracts. An example of 
this type of regulatory involvement is the requirement of a standard insolvency 
clause, which allows the receiver of an insolvent insurer to collect on reinsurance 
contracts. While few states require the filing or approval of reinsurance contracts, 
indirect regulation of reinsurance contracts and rates does exist. For example, 
restrictions on insurance rates affect reinsurance rates. Generally, if the amount 
paid in the premium to the insurer is limited, the amount of premium paid under a 
quota share reinsurance contract may also be limited."). 
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Still, the multi-state system leads to some fears of inadequacy and 
redundancy. To address these issues, along with the perennial problem of 
construing the appropriate way for the states to share in the taxation of 
these transactions, the House of Representatives in June 2007 passed HR 
1065, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act.99  The Senate 
companion bill, S 929, awaits consideration in the Senate.'' That 
legislation would create a single state authority to determine the 
appropriateness of reinsurance credit and reinsurer solvency assessment.10l 
The solvency assessment would be conducted by the reinsurer's home state 
and the credit determination would be made solely by the ceding insurer's 
domiciliary state. 10 2 It is unclear how this alters the current regulatory 
system other than to encourage reinsurers or insurers to change their 
domiciles in search of a state whose regulation best comports with their 
needs, though it likely will assist in clarifying taxation. In any event, these 
Congressional efforts reflect an understanding of reinsurance's direct effect 
on insurer's solvency. 
By this legislative activity, it is apparent the regulators are not 
entirely unaware of the financial effects a reinsurer default could have on 
reinsureds. Yet, this type of legislation is still limited to regulation of 
reinsurance only as a source of funds for the domestic insurer. Basically, it 
reflects a conceptualization of reinsurance as a mere contractually acquired 
source of capital. There is no attempt in the regulatory legislation to move 
beyond solvency and to address the effects the terms a reinsurance 
agreement may have on their reinsured's performance as regards their 
underlying policyholders. So far as regulators appear concerned, their 
responsibility to regulate reinsurance ends with regulating solvency. 
99 National Association of Insurance Commisioners, Current Issues: 
Nonadmitted Insurance and Reinsurance, http://www.naic.org/topics/topic_ 
surplus lines.html (last visited February 19, 2009). 
1oo Id. (That legislation would grant exclusive regulatory authority for multi-
state surplus lines and to the insured's home state so as to restrict each transaction 
to a single set of regulatory oversight, rules and taxation). 
01Id. 
102 id. 
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C. RISK EXITS AND FRONTING 
A third commonly accepted purpose of reinsurance allows the 
primary insurer to cease writing some policies.'13 An insurer that seeks to 
exit a certain risk stream can be relieved of the risks of loss from those 
policies and exit that insurance market via appropriate reinsurance. 1°4 This 
allows a certain amount of flexibility to insurers by allowing them to shift 
direction in their future business choices. 
0 5 
A few caveats are necessary here. By reinsuring the entire loss, the 
primary insurer generally has not freed itself from its direct responsibilities 
to its policyholders, despite even a 100% risk transfer to the reinsuring 
companies. In other words, though it may have successfully transferred the 
risks of loss, it did not transfer its servicing responsibilities to the reinsurer. 
Again, reinsurance is generally defined as a secondary indemnity 
agreement and the reinsurer does not usually assume a direct claims 
handling relationship with the policyholders of the reinsured. 10 6 Reinsuring 
agreements can, however, include "cut-out" provisions, which allow a 
direct action by the policyholders against the reinsurer; provisions like 
these change the reinsuring relationship. 
10 7 
103 JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1056-57 ("Just as reinsurance enables an 
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer 
to leave a particular kind of business quickly. An insurer that wants to rid itself of 
a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the 
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and 
makes the reinsurer the insurer for all of the risks.").
104 id 
105 id. 
106 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at § 
40.01 ("In essence, reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies. It is a 
contractual arrangement under which an insurer secures coverage from a reinsurer 
for a potential loss to which it is exposed under insurance policies issued to 
original insureds. The risk indemnified against is the risk that the insurer will have 
to pay on the underlying insured risk. Because reinsurance is a contract of 
indemnity, absent specific cash-call provisions, the reinsurer is not required to pay 
under the contract until after the original insurer has paid a loss to its original 
insured."). 
'07 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 27 (noting 
the definition of the term 'cut-through endorsement' as "an endorsement to an 
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One benefit of the reinsurer's role instead of the primary insurer 
role is that the reinsurer is generally free from direct original policyholder 
action. For this reason, the standards of contract performance and the 
mutual obligations of the reinsured and reinsurer differ in type and 
structure from that of policyholder and insurer. Some of these relationships 
and the differences of obligations are described in Section IV of this Essay. 
Too much direct interaction by the reinsurer and the original policyholder 
will force the reinsurer to be treated simply as an insurer of the 
policyholder, obviating some of the benefits and performance obligations 
associated with the reinsuring agreement, usually to the reinsurer's 
detriment. Likewise, though there is nothing to prevent the kind of direct 
assumption of the primary insurer's role, such a situation really is better 
understood as a novation of the original primary insurance policies, rather 
than the type of reinsurance agreement for business agility that is the more 
common purpose of seeking reinsurance for indemnity purposes. 
Another brief caveat is also useful here. Placing reinsurance for 
100% of a certain type of underwriting business for the purpose of exiting 
the business is likewise different from another type of 100% reinsuring 
agreement that displays certain similar characteristics. In "fronting 
agreements", an insurer will enter into a policy with the understanding that 
another party, a reinsurer, will be responsible for the entire amount that it is 
required to pay under the policy. I08  One New York court described a 
fronting agreement or "fronting cessation" as an arrangement where an 
insurer issues a policy on a risk "with an understanding that another party 
will insure it".'0 9 The purpose of these "fronting agreements" is to allow a 
reinsurer not qualified or licensed to do business in the state, the 
insurance policy or reinsurance contract which provides that, in the event of the 
insolvency of the insurance company, the amount of any loss which would have 
been recovered from the reinsurer by the insurance company (or its statutory 
receiver) will be paid instead directly to the policyholder, claimant, or other payee, 
as specified by the endorsement, by the reinsurer."). 
108See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(describing a fronting agreement as a "well established ad perfectly legal scheme" 
where policies are issued by state-licensed insurance companies and then 
immediately reinsured to 100 percent of face value). 
109Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp. 265, 267 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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opportunity to profit from the sale of insurance transactions in that state." 0 
Generally, the licensed insurer will receive a fee for acting as the "front"."' 
Despite the slightly pejorative terms used in this arrangement, there is 
nothing illegal in a domestic insurer acting as a front for the unauthorized 
insurer. In fact, so long as all other regulatory goals are met, these 
relationships can allow for a significant increase in insurance capacity. 112 
D. Loss STABILITY 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reinsurance is a mechanism 
for insurers to stabilize their profits and expected losses.13 Insurance does 
and always has concerned risk.'1 4 Using reinsurance, the primary insurer 
can set a limit on its exposure by facultative insurance for any given risk, 
use a surplus treaty to create a ceiling on aggregate loss or determine its 
percentage of risk retained through a pro-rata arrangement.'5 In this way, 
110See Union Sav. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Central Life Ins. Co., 813 F. 
Supp. 481, 484 (S. D. Miss. 1993). 
"11 See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1336 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
112 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at § 
40.04[5] ("A licensed reinsurer can front for an unauthorized reinsurer or a 
reinsurance syndicate, to permit the ceding insurer to take credit for the reinsurance 
without need for security."). 
113JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 ("A fourth purpose of reinsurance is 
to stabilize insurers' profits and losses."). 
114See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 49 (noting 
the definition of the term 'risk' as "a term which defines uncertainty of loss, 
chance of loss, or the variance of actual from expected results as it relates to 
coverage provided under an insurance or reinsurance contract. Also the term is 
used to identify the object of insurance protection, e.g., a building, an automobile, 
a human life, or exposure to liability. In reinsurance, each ceding company 
customarily makes its own rules for defining a risk."). 
115REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 ("Insurers 
often seeks to reduce the wide swings in profits and loss margins inherent to the 
insurance business. These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of 
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known 
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even cumulative losses can be restricted to designated limits. 116 The 
insurer uses reinsurance as a form of stability control, enabling them to 
fulfill their obligations to policyholders in a continuous manner" 7 and 
potentially stabilize their profits. 8 
IV. REINSURANCE AS PRIVATE REGULATOR 
As we have seen, reinsurance is a flexible and multifunctional 
arrangement. If the benefits of reinsurance to insurers were not so 
attractive, this multinational, trillion dollar industry would not be nearly 
such a popular choice of insurers. Yet, the potential for reinsurance to 
affect the business conduct of insurers has not been among insurance 
regulatory concerns. This is likely because reinsurance is considered to 
consist of agreements between sufficiently sophisticated parties so as to 
require little formal regulatory oversight of the relationship. That 
conclusion, however, precludes the understanding that through the medium 
of contracting for reinsurance, the insurer subjects itself to limitations - a 
kind of private legislation- similar to that of a consumer policyholder with 
its insurer. Just as with primary insurance, the existence of a reinsurance 
agreement limits the options of insurer action if they wish to benefit from 
the reinsuring agreement. 
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these 
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company's overall operating 
results."). 
116 JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 ("Through reinsurance, the 
maximum losses on policies can be kept to manageable levels, and cumulative 
losses over a period oftime can be kept within a designated limit."). 
117 Corcoran v. Universal Reins. Corp., 713 F. Supp. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
("Insurance companies depend upon reinsurance contracts for financial stability 
and hence their ability to fulfill their obligations under their policies."). 
118 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 4 ("Insurers 
often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent to the 
insurance business. These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of 
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known 
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these 
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company's overall results."). 
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This is so because the reinsurance agreement is not one without 
conditions. Those conditions include everything from offering the 
reinsurer access to its underwriting philosophy 19 and underwriting success 
rates, to providing defenses to reinsurance performance based on 
inadequate claims handling. Moreover, the sheer breadth of the advantages 
available to an insurer from reinsurance make it likely that a prudent 
insurer will keep in mind the requirements and interests of the reinsurance 
industry while setting its underwriting and claims handling mechanisms in 
place. 120 Just like a consumer policyholder will seek to keep his losses 
down to attract lower cost insurance, so will an insurer strive to make itself 
attractive to reinsurers. 
Importantly, it must be recognized that reinsurance is generally not 
a one-off deal. Rather, reinsurance agreements are entered into for a 
specific time and are often then renegotiated.12' When a party is aware that 
its conduct under one agreement will affect the terms of its next agreement, 
it can only be assumed that the party will seek to mitigate activities which 
could have a future negative financial effect. If one can agree on nothing 
else as regards the insurance industry, the capacity for these companies to 
consider their long term financial interests should be somewhat obvious. 
Another aspect of this discussion is not just that insurers seek to 
make themselves fiscally attractive risks to their reinsurers, an activity that 
119 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 57 (noting 
the definition of underwriting capacity as "[t]he maximum amount of money an 
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a 
given period. The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be 
imposed by law or regulatory authority."). 
120 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 (noting 
"[i]nsurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit liability 
on specific risks; (2) to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against 
catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity. Depending on the ceding company's 
goals, different types of reinsurance contracts are available to bring about the 
desired result."). 
121 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 13 (noting 
"reinsurance contracts must be shaped to the ceding insurer's unique requirements. 
No two contracts are alike - all have marked variations in retention levels, 
coverages and exclusions. An insurance company's needs for reinsurance depend 
on its book of business and financial and underwriting strategies. The reinsurance 
contract, and hence reinsurance premiums, must be individually tailored and 
determined by the parties."). 
2009] REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR? 
any party seeking capital would undertake. Rather it is the identification 
that terms and standards common to the reinsurance relationship have the 
potential to affect insurance company action as regards their primary 
policyholder in areas that come within the bounds of current insurance 
regulatory interests. Specifically, insurer practices in underwriting and 
claims handling. 
A. A BRIEF LOOK AT INSURANCE REGULATORY GOALS: THE 
22 
IDEA OF "AEQUUM ET BoNuM".1
Insurance regulation seeks to achieve a complex set of goals 
through the regulation of insurance. Regulation, as discussed earlier, 
frequently concerns itself with issues of insurer solvency.' 23 This interest is 
not conceived of solely as an attempt to keep a lucrative industry 
functioning. Rather, insurer solvency regulation exists in large part to 
obviate the harm to insured policyholders who would be hurt as a result the 
insurer's insolvency. 24 Unlike many other types of transactions, insurance 
does not lend itself to being the type of product that can be replaced if, just 
as a policyholder should come to need the insurer to perform, the 
policyholder were to learn that its company has defaulted as a result of 
insolvency. Put even more plainly, if insufficient reserves cause an insurer 
to default as a result of too many claims being made, in a catastrophe 
scenario for example, the negative externalities of that default are 
potentially extreme.' 
25 
122 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (8th ed. 2004) (noting the term 
secundum aequum et bonum means "[a]ccording to what is just and good."). 
123 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 13 (noting 
"reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency."). 
124 See STARING, supranote 20, § 19, at 19-1(noting "[r]einsurance has certain 
advantages which accrue to the insured public as well.. .reinsurance coverage 
represents an added shield protecting a policyholder against uncompensated loss. 
This advantage to the insureds is realized most obviously in the event of the 
primary insurer's insolvency. "Thus, from the perspective of an insured or 
policyholder, the insolvency of the primary insurer may make any reinsurance the 
only or de facto source of at least partial compensation for losses incurred."). 
125 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (noting 
"[r]einsurance provides protection against catastrophic loss in much the same way 
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Solvency, however, is not the only goal of insurance regulation. 
Rather the mission of insurance regulators is also to assure consumers of 
fair treatment and protection from unfair trade practices. 12 6 Fairness can be 
seen to include appropriate access to insurance and the prevention of 
impermissible discriminatory practices and other notions of consumer 
protection. Taken as a whole, this amorphous "public policy" regulatory 
interest has perhaps been best characterized by some academics as the 
insurance regulatory principle of "Aequum et Bonum".1
27 
Used to encompass a spectrum of "public good" regulatory 
objectives, the identification of this principle is a useful shorthand. These 
"public good" regulatory goals are translated into regulatory policy in a 
it helps stabilize an insurer's loss experience. Insurers use reinsurance to protect 
against catastrophes in two ways. First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic 
financial loss resulting from a single event, such as the total fire loss of a large 
manufacturing plant. Second, reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of 
many smaller claims resulting from a single event, such as an earthquake or major 
hurricane, that affects many policyholders simultaneously. While the insurer is 
able to cover losses individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer 
wishes to retain."). 
126Insurance regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk 
containment and default. However, risk of default is not the sole purview of 
insurance regulation. Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest, 
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and 
equitable normative policies. For example, the Connection Department of 
Insurance describes its mission as follows: 
The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve 
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing 
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by 
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient 
manner which promotes a competitive and financially sound 
insurance market for consumers, and by enforcing the insurance 
laws to ensure that consumers are treated fairly and are protected 
from unfair practices. 
Connecticut Insurance Department: Our Mission Statement, 
http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396. 
127 See Howell E. Jackson & Edward L. Symons Jr., Regulation of Financial 
Institutions 452 (1998). 
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variety of ways and it has not escaped notice that "the objective ofaequum 
et bonum is present in some degree to most systems of insurance law and 
regulation. It has many facets: It is equality. It is morality. It is fairness, 
equality, reasonableness. It may even be efficiency, economy,128 
parsimony."' 
Generally this principle is reflected in the tripartite goals that rates 
not be "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory", the standard 
2 9language in nearly every state's regulatory legislation. 1 Likewise 
regulations prohibiting unfair trade practices in the handling of a claim are 
created in the interest of consumer protection and fairness. 13 0 This can be 
seen to reflect a somewhat disjointed effort to stay true to the "public 
interest" as best as it can be defined by regulators and courts while at the 
same time offering a private industry an opportunity for profit in an 
industry demanding regulated solvency. For this reason, underwriting 
practices, the assignment of rates to the sale of insurance, and its corollary 
- claims handling - are within the purview of insurance regulatory 
interest. '3 
In their regulatory efforts Insurance Commissioners have not 
apparently considered the potential effect reinsurance agreements could 
have on insurers performance of their obligations to their policyholders, nor 
does there appear to have been any systemic review of the public policy 
128 id. 
129 This authorization for regulatory efforts in these identifiably somewhat 
conflicting and unclear goals is supported by the long standing identification of 
insurance as something other than a purely private contractual affair. As courts 
have long noted, "It is no longer open to question that the business of insurance is 
affected with a public interest... Neither the company nor a policyholder has the 
inviolate rights that characterize private contracts." Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 74 P.2d 761, 774 (Cal. 1937). Thus, "[t]he contract of the policyholder is 
subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police power." Id. at 774-75. 
130 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 13 
(noting the NAIC works in conjunction with state insurance regulators in serving 
the public interest and facilitating "the fair and equitable treatment of insurance 
consumers."). 
131 See id. (noting fundamental insurance regulatory goals include protecting 
the public interest, promoting competitive markets, promoting the reliability, 
solvency, and financial solidity of insurance institutions, and supporting and 
improving state regulation of insurance."). 
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concerns implicated by the availability of reinsurance for coverage of bad-
faith extracontractual damages 132 as a matter of consumer protection. In 
the next sections, we will identify how the core principle of reinsurance 
agreements- the reciprocal duty of good faith- when taken in concert with 
other common reinsurance doctrines and practices, have the capability of 
influencing insurer behavior on an industry wide scale. Likewise, we will 
review how the court's interpretation of these obligations have the potential 
to affect insurance claims handling decisions and practices. Finally, we 
will review a series of available reinsurance clauses that seem to be 
antithetical to consumer protection goals and reduction of coverage 
litigation. 
B. GOOD FAITH As A REGULATOR OF UNDERWRITING AND 
CLAIMS HANDLING PRACTICES 
Reinsurance obligates the parties to act in good faith.' 33 In fact, in 
can be said that this duty of good faith - enforced by the courts- is the core 
principle by which reinsurance operates in its myriad forms. 134 
132 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 29 (noting 
the definition of extra-contractual obligations as "monetary awards or settlements 
against an insurer for its alleged wrongful conduct to its insured. Such payments 
required of an insurer to its insured are extra-contractual in that they are not 
covered in the underlying contract."). 
133 See PLITr, supra note 9, §9:17, at 56-57 (noting "[d]uties of good faith and 
fair dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between 
the initial insured and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer's 
need to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating 
risks and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance 
contract. Accordingly, this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer 
all material facts which may affect the subject risk."). 
134 See STARING, supranote 20, § 12:1, at 1-2 ("The long and well established 
tradition that reinsurance transactions are a matter of 'utmost good faith' between 
the parties has had a predictable effect on the preparation of reinsurance 
contracts... The typical reinsurance contract is a relatively short, concise document, 
noticeably lacking in the legalisms so characteristic of other types of contracts. 
This underlying assumption of utmost good faith allows the companies to draft a 
document that assumes both parties are so knowledgeable on the subject matter to 
be dealt with and possess such a degree of sophistication as to preclude the 
necessity got long, expository declarations of intent and implementation."). 
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Importantly, courts reviewing this doctrine have often interpreted it to 
require specific insurance company behavior as a condition precedent to 
requiring reinsurer performance of its indemnity obligation.' 35 Hence, 
failure to act in good faith affords the reinsurer a defense to its reinsurance 
obligation.'3 6 Since reinsurance is frequently only triggered by extremely 
large dollar value claims, preventing the release of its reinsurer for a lack of 
good faith behavior will undoubtedly be of paramount concern to a prudent 
insurance company. 
i. The Duty of GoodFaithin Underwriting 
One of the strangest aspects of reinsurance is the often overlooked 
question of how reinsurance could ever exist without becoming cost 
prohibitive. If one were to simply think about reinsurance in terms of risk 
assessment, there seems little way that the addition of multiple new players 
in the insuring process would not add and continue adding to the cost of 
insurance. After all, due diligence is an expensive proposition. How could 
all these different reinsurance institutions capably evaluate the true risks of 
all the policies which they agree to reinsure, particularly in the treaty 
context, without accruing costs as large as, if not larger than, the original 
insurer? 137 The answer is simply that in the reinsurance treaty context they 
simply do not engage in that kind of investigation, instead they rely on the 
underwriting skills of their reinsureds. 38 Investigation costs are limited to 
35See e.g. Liquidation of Union Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 
674 N.E.2d 313, 319-20 (N.Y. 1996). 
136 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1059 ("The primary insurer and 
reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and the reinsurer will 
have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of warranty, fraud, or 
concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer's acts or neglect give rise 
to the defense."). 
137 See PLrrr, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 56-57 ("Duties of good faith and fair 
dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the 
initial insured and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer's need 
to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured's efforts in properly evaluating risks 
and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract."). 
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delving into the potential reinsured's loss experiences, underwriting skills 
and claims handling competence. 
139 
How is action like that considered prudent? As we have seen to 
our great dismay in the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the consequences of 
opaque risk acquisition can be remarkably severe. In reinsurance, the 
reciprocal obligations of good faith obviates this problem in the reinsurance 
context. 140 In reinsurance, this duty often requires, "the most abundant 
good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; 
[including] the absence of any concealment or deception, however 
slight". 14 1 Viewing utmost good faith as appropriately sufficient to govern 
trillions of dollars of transactions is interesting in and of itself, yet, as the 
138 See STARING, supranote 20, § 2:6, at 7 ("The reinsurer will always have at 
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured's 
underwriting and claims practices."). 
139 id. 
140 See PLITT, supra note 9, at 57-58 ("[The duty of good faith] requires the 
reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which may affect the subject 
risk. The extension of this duty of good faith is the related concept that reinsurers 
are generally bound by the reinsured's good faith decision to pay a claim, 
commonly referred to as the 'follow the settlements' doctrine. The purpose for this 
rule is to prevent situations in which reinsurers, in attempt to deny coverage, use 
against the reinsured the same coverage arguments made by the reinsured against 
the original insured, essentially eroding the good faith relationship needed in the 
reinsurance context. The limiting factor, preventing the abuse of this doctrine, is 
the determination of whether the reinsured's payment was made in good faith."). 
141 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1060. (noting that good faith "is the 
position of reinsurers that their contracts are those of 'utmost good faith.' Utmost 
good faith contracts of any kind are so delicate in character and so susceptible of 
abuse that unusual precautions must be observed by both parties in their 
implementation. The business of reinsurance often involves considerable oral 
exchange of information between primary insurer and reinsurer, and the reliability 
of this information is very important. The resemblance of the customary practices 
to how business used to be conducted at the Lloyd's Coffee House of old is 
unmistakable. The strict law of warranty which applied to the old transactions at 
Lloyd's probably has something in common with the duty of 'utmost good faith' 
which applies in reinsurance. Both doctrines have the effect of ratcheting up the 
expectations contracting parties can reasonably possess with regard to the accuracy 
of information shared by the other party."). 
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Second Circuit has noted, it is the core relationship that allows for 
reinsuring to profitably occur. As they explained: 
Historically, the reinsurance market has relied on a 
practice of the exercise of good faith to decrease 
monitoring costs and ex ante contracting costs. 
Reinsurance works only if the sums of reinsurance 
premiums are less than the original insurance premium. 
Otherwise, the ceding insurer will not reinsure. For the 
reinsurance premiums to be less reinsurers cannot 
duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the primary 
insurer in evaluating risks and handling claims ... 
Reinsurers are protected, however, by a large area of 
common interest with ceding insurers and by the 
tradition of utmost good faith, particularly in the sharing
142 
of information. 
In other words, in exchange for placing the reinsurance at a price 
less than the original premiums, the reinsurer is allowed to rely on the good 
faith of the reinsured. 143  In order for treaty reinsurance to function 
economically, the reinsurer cannot duplicate the underwriting functions 
engaged in by insurers at the time they placed the original coverage.' 44 
142 Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
143 See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1060. ("Not all insurance law 
doctrines are ratcheted up when it comes to reinsurance arrangements, however. 
As one court explained, '[r]einsurance contracts, unlike primary insurance 
contracts, are not contracts of adhesion. Rather, reinsurance involves two 
sophisticated business entities familiar with the business of reinsurance who 
bargain at arms-length for the terms in their contract.' Thus, a rule like the notice-
prejudice rule, which is designed to equalize the relationship between insured and 
primary insurer, may be deemed irrelevant to the reinsurance setting, and an 
insurer that fails to give timely notice to a reinsurer may find itself unable to defeat 
the reinsurer's late notice defense on the ground that the reinsure failed to show 
prejudice."). 
144See ERIc M. HOLMEs & L. ANTHONY SuTiN, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE § 102.4(a) (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE] (noting "[u]nderwriting is largely retrospective, focusing on the 
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However, that does not mean the reinsurer does not take an interest 
in the underwriting activities of its reinsureds. As explained by the 
Reinsurance Association of America: 
While treaty reinsurance does not require review of 
individual risks by the reinsurer, it demands careful 
review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and 
historical experience of the ceding insurer, including a 
thoughtful evaluation of the company's attitude toward 
claims management, engineering control, as well as the 
management's general background, expertise and
45 
planned objectives.1 
Keeping these criteria in mind, it is difficult to imagine insurance 
companies would not create and institutionalize underwriting practices that 
are most likely to attract reinsurers if they want to benefit from 
reinsurance.' 46 Moreover, the reinsured company would want to ensure 
that it kept particularly good records of its underwriting efforts, as they are 
required by their good faith obligation to "disclose to the reinsurer all 
material facts which may affect the subject risk".1
47 
So great is the reinsurer recognition of their risk in relying on the 
underwriting decisions of their reinsured's that reinsurance contracts 
frequently include a clause which allows the reinsurer access to their 
reinsured's "books and claims and underwriting files", 148 if it finds such an 
financial condition and expertise of the ceding insurer. A reinsurer would be well-
advised, however, to undertake a careful review of the practices and standards of a 
prospective reinsured under a treaty. Many reinsurance treaties embody 
longstanding relationships between the parties and have been renewed many times 
over the decades."). 
145 See Reinsurance Association of America, supra note 11, at 7. 
146See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6, at 7. ("The reinsurer will always have at 
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured's 
underwriting and claims practices."). 
147See PLrrT, supranote 9, § 9:17, at 57. 
148 See STARING, supra note 20, §15:8. 
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audit necessary. Known as "audit and inspection clauses", these clauses 
require "the reinsured's records relative to the contract sessions to be 
always open to the reinsurer at reasonable times.' ' 149 These clauses offer an 
opportunity for the reinsurer to review their reinsured's underwriting and 
claims handling practices to assure itself that the reinsured company is 
acting in conformance with its expectations and that the claims made on it 
come within scope of its reinsurance contract.1 50 By this method, 
reinsurer's have the capacity to keep themselves abreast of their reinsured's 
underwriting and claims handling practices in an ongoing manner, when 
such inquiry is reasonable. And, in the event of a dispute it allows them the 
opportunity for a direct audit. 
ii. The Capacity of Reinsurance to Stifle Underwriting
Innovation 
 
The search for information implies the capacity for reaction. The 
interplay of the duty of good faith and audit clauses offer the reinsurer the 
opportunity to monitor their reinsured's practices. Such monitoring has the 
capacity to influence the way in which reinsured's create and apply their 
underwriting discretion. Particularly for smaller insurance companies, 
dependant on reinsurance to take on the larger risks, it would not be 
beneficial to adopt underwriting practices which stray too far from the 
industry's accepted norm. 5' Should such a company attempt it, 
undoubtedly the company would have to charge higher premiums in order 
149 Id. (noting that this right is not without limits and does not permit access to 
all the reinsured's books generally, rather the audit is limited to the scope of the 
relationship between the parties). 
150 Id.(noting that audit and inspection clauses are found in both treaty and 
facultative agreements so that treaty reinsured must make available their relevant 
books and facultative reinsured's must keep the reinsurer "advised at various levels 
of detail with respect to claims under the policy"). 
151 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supranote 11, at 5-6 (noting
"reinsurers often provide insurers with a variety of other services. Some reinsurers 
provide guidance to insurers in underwriting, claims reserving and handling, 
investments, and even general management. These services are particularly 
important to smaller companies interested in entering new lines of insurance."). 
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to entice reinsurers to take on their risks. 52 Likewise, those companies 
which require greater amounts of reinsurance to comply with their reserve 
requirements could also be discouraged from adopting broader or unusual 
underwriting procedures. 
53 
The inclusion of the reinsurer's interest of "underwriting 
philosophy", "historical experience of the ceding insurer" and "attention to 
the attitude of claims management" suggest that to the extent the industry 
profits from and seeks reinsurance for its business interests, those interests 
will militate in favor of choices which may not be completely congruent 
with all aspects of the regulators objectives; particularly those objectives 
which come within the broad understating of aequum et bonum. It is not 
beyond the realm of possibility that access to insurance could be restricted 
for less profitable groups or only offered at a higher cost, implicating 
notions of fairness. 
Though reinsurance monitoring may have the capacity to 
somewhat stifle or raise the cost of innovation, perhaps even to the point of 
raising issues of unfairness, there may well be some positive public good 
from the effect of reinsurance monitoring of underwriting practices. 
Reinsurers' interest in the underwriting and claim handling processes of its 
reinsureds might well suffice as a strong financial incentive towards 
maintaining professional and non-biased underwriting practices - a 
regulatory goal. The reinsurer's sole interest is its own financial one. To 
that end, the industry will seek out and reward those insurers who most 
accurately measure and rate risks. Though the reinsurance industry may 
not have an active incentive to broaden access to insurance for public 
policy reasons, it also has no active disincentive to restrict the sale of 
properly underwritten policies. As a whole, reinsurers profit from having 
insurance policies available to reinsure. Given the capacity for reinsurance 
to assist small insurers to compete on an asset basis with larger companies, 
152 New insurance lines are often covered facultatively until a sufficient loss 
history is developed to attract treaty reinsurance. See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 
771. ("Demand for facultative reinsurance also exists for new insurance lines, 
specialty lines, or insurance products that are developed to cover traditionally 
uninsured risks. Such risks and exposures, if accepted by a reinsurer, are likely to 
be accepted only on a facultative basis because they transcend existing actuarial 
and ratemaking techniques."). 
153 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 48 (noting 
the term 'reserve' means "[a]n amount which is established to provide for payment 
of a future obligation."). 
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reinsurance's availability can act to support companies writing policies for 
previously underserviced policyholders. In any event, reinsurers' interest 
in the underwriting procedures of those they reinsure undoubtedly serves 
the pseudo-regulatory function of encouraging actuarially sound 
underwriting practices by rewarding those companies with greater access to 
reinsurance. For this reason alone, reinsurance can be perceived as 
effecting industry practice beyond questions of solvency. 
iii. ReinsurerMonitoringof UnderwritingHistoryand the 
Potential 
For Market Response, the risk of reinsurance rate consequences 
does appear to effect insurance industry practice. A look to the facultative 
reinsurance market suggests that insurers are very concerned in maintaining 
attractive loss histories and are sensitive to reinsurance costs when making 
underwriting decisions. Remember, facultative reinsurance is used to 
mitigate the effect of the phenomena of the unusual risk costing more than 
the easily forecastable risk and is usually placed when the risk would not be 
accepted under a treaty. 154 Again, it is through facultative reinsurance that 
an insurer could acquire reinsurance for a specific risk, a specific policy or 
5 5  a specific group of policies. 1 It is for this reason that facultative 
154 See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 770-771 ("By definition facultative 
placements involve risks that fall outside the general parameters of a treaty 
reinsurance program. Facultative reinsurance is purchased by primary insurance 
companies, captives, or reinsurers to cover assumed business that, for one reason 
or another, will not be ceded to a treaty."). 
155 See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 at 7-8. ("Facultative reinsurance of a 
single risk, which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the 
last half of the Nineteenth Century. A treaty, which is a long term contract 
covering more than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821. Treaties 
became common around the beginning ofthe Twentieth Century and one form, the 
excess of loss treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San 
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906."). See also JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b], 
at 1054 ("Facultative reinsurance involves the primary insurer entering into an 
agreement for the reinsurance of a particular risk. The reinsurance can be written 
on a pro rata or an excess basis; the root word 'faculty' denotes that the reinsurer 
has a choice of accepting or rejecting any risk proposed and of demanding 
whatever premium it thinks appropriate."). 
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reinsurance "usually covers catastrophic or unusual risks". 156 Facultative 
reinsurance, however, will likely be more expensive per risk than broader 
treaty reinsurance because with facultative reinsurance the reinsurer often 
employs "substantial personnel and technical resources" to underwrite 
those risks.15 7 Treaty reinsurance avoids this kind of cost 
Yet, it is common practice to combine treaty and facultative 
reinsurance to protect an insurer's loss history with its treaty reinsurer. 
Companies often use facultative insurance to protect loss histories even 
though reinsurance coverage for the facultative risk already existed under 
treaty reinsurance agreements. The insurer's strategic decision to enter the 
additional facultative agreement as a hedge against unexpected losses on a 
risk is done with an eye out to protect against losses which would otherwise 
have the capacity to trigger a renegotiation of the insurer's entire treaty or 
cause future treaties to be reinsured at a higher cost. 
As an example, the Reinsurance Association of America 
5 8 
describes a situation where in order to accommodate a policyholder, an 
insurer may agree to provide commercial automobile insurance coverage -
a higher risk activity. The RAA argues that additional facultative 
reinsurance 59 would be appropriate in this situation even if the treaty 
reinsurance 160 the insurer had already placed did not exclude commercial 
156 See Reinsurance Association of America, supranote 11, at 7. 
157 1d. at8. 
...See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Who We Are, 
http://reinsurance.org/i4a/pages/index.cfn?pageid=3615. (The RAA describes 
themselves as "...a national trade association, headquartered in Washington, 
D.C., that is committed to an activist agenda to represent the interests of the 
property and casualty reinsurance industry in Congress, state legislatures, and 
international forums."). 
159See HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at §102.4(b) 
(noting "[a] facultative reinsurance contract is written to cove a specifically 
identified risk. Both the ceding insurer and the reinsurer have the option (or 
'faculty,' from the Latin for ability) to affect reinsurance on a risk-by-risk basis. 
Neither is obligated to cede or assume any given risk."). 
160Id.(noting "reinsurance treaties are blanket agreements negotiated between 
an reinsured and a reinsurer under which reinsurance is automatically provided for 
all policies issued by the reinsured that meet the criteria of the treaty. Treaty 
reinsurance is sometimes (but rarely) called automatic reinsurance. When a treaty 
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automobile coverage to "protect its losses under applicable treaty 
agreements". As the RAA points out, the facultative "rider" need not even 
be purchased from the treaty reinsurers, allowing those potential 
commercial automobile losses to be handled under a completely separate 
relationship. This suggests the overall cost of ongoing higher treaty 
premiums is sufficiently grave to encourage the additional cost of "double 
reinsuring" certain risks, even at the relatively higher specific cost of the 
facultative agreement. 
In any event, this common choice to pair facultative with treaty 
reinsurance to protect loss histories 161 supports the conclusion that 
reinsurance monitoring of loss histories does effect reinsurance choices. 
This monitoring of underwriting practices 62 has the capacity to effect 
underwriting decisions holistically and possibly industry-wide as insurers 
choose to implement practices that conform to the reinsurance market's 
interests and prevent them from making underwriting risks which may 
negatively affect their reinsurance opportunities. To an extent, this natural 
interplay of loss history with reinsurance costs can create a self-regulating 
and self-limiting tendency among certain insurers to produce loss histories 
lower than similarly situated insurers. 
Whether this activity is congruent with all articulated insurance 
regulatory interests is open to question, but there certainly exists the 
potential for segmentation of the market and increased costs for some 
policyholders. The simplest way for insurers to decrease loss histories is to 
restrict their business to lower risk policyholders or limit their dollar 
exposure to those risks. A "cherry picked" book of business, for example 
is in force, the ceding insurer is obligated to cede and the reinsurer is obligated to 
accept all of the risks within the scope of the treaty."). 
161 See id. (noting "a reinsured can structure an elaborate program of 
reinsurance using a combination of treaties and facultative contracts, using one or 
multiple reinsurers."). 
162 Not only are underwriting practices monitored on a general basis, but in 
conformity with the reinsurer's need to rely on their reinsured's underwriting 
expertise, the duty of good faith requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer 
all material facts which may affect the insured risk. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, 
supranote 10, at § 16:03[a], at 1036-37 ("It is a basic obligation of a reinsured to 
disclose to potential reinsurers all material facts regarding the original risk of loss, 
and failure to do so renders a reinsurance agreement voidable or rescindable."). 
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could attract more reinsurance interest; as a result, the cherry-picking 
insurer can charge lower premiums to gain an even bigger bowl of cherries. 
To the extent that this segmentation would not have occurred but 
for the reinsurance interests, reinsurance can be seen as having an effect on 
underwriting. There would still be an interest in insuring and reinsuring 
lemons, of course, so long as they can and will pay higher premiums which 
could be shared with the reinsurer, but the potential for reinsurance pricing 
to encourage cherry-picking can be somewhat troubling. The competitive 
advantage an insurer can obtain through reduced reinsurance premiums 
may militate against the traditional benefits afforded by the law of large 
numbers. The insurer could determine their best option for profit lay in the 
reinsurance cost saving produced by the lower risks. 
An insurer with a sufficiently broad market share and multi-line 
business, of course, could get what would amount to a "bulk discount" for 
placing most of its reinsurance business with one company. But, if smaller 
insurers took the "cherry" approach and were rewarded with sufficiently 
lower premiums to compete against even the "bulk" advantage, the move 
towards segmentation would start when the big insurer slowly (or even 
quickly) began to loose enough of its cherries to affect its loss history in a 
way significant enough to offset its "bulk" appeal to its reinsurers. 
Remember, the reinsurance market is extremely broad, with at least 50% of 
domestic insurers reinsured by foreign companies. 163  There is likely 
always some reinsurer around with a taste for cherries. 
Importantly, reinsurance's effect on cherry-picked risk premiums 
does not always result in the company actually restricting their business to 
those "better" risks alone. There is no reason why reinsurance treaties must 
be structured so as to take the entire book of business for a certain type of 
risk, though they often are structured that way.164 An insurer could reinsure 
with one company for their "better" risks at the lower prices, seek a 
competitive advantage on the market, and move the worse risks into a 
163 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1 
("Reinsurance can be purchased from three distinct sources: reinsurance companies 
located in the United States, reinsurance departments of U.S. primary insurance 
companies, and alien reinsurers that are located outside the U.S. and not licensed 
here. The ceding insurer may purchase reinsurance directly from a reinsurer or 
through a broker or reinsurance intermediary."). 
164 See HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at § 102.4A, at 
32 (noting "[a] treaty may be written to cover some or all of an insurer's line of 
business"). 
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different book charged higher premiums; premiums sufficient to entice a 
different reinsurer. A different insurer could acquire better overall pricing 
by averaging the two pools, but it could face difficulty getting those 
cherries away from the segmented insurer, moving the whole market 
towards segmentation. 
There is also the possibility that certain types of policyholders -
likely corporate ones- which could be sufficiently attractive to an insurer so 
as to make the relative reinsurance benefits irrelevant. If, for example, the 
worse risks in one line were restricted to those who proved more profitable 
for the company on some other business basis, like companies interested in 
multi-line policies or companies which in some sense represent loss 
leaders, the higher reinsurance premiums could be offset for even those 
"worse" risks. This offset provides the book of business with a competitive 
advantage. Yet, even that potential benefit would have to be consistently 
reevaluated in relation to current market rates and costs of reinsurance. If 
the advantage of getting the big book of business did not offset the higher 
reinsurance rates, it would no longer be profitable, forcing the insurer to 
raise its rates across the board. And, just as with the possible loss of 
cherries scenarios described above, if another insurance company could 
convince the multi-line user it was better served by spinning off the 
insurance of its cherry risks for a significantly lower premium; such 
competition could again support a move toward segmentation. 
Unfortunately, in all these scenarios, there exists the risk of 
identification of a certain class of generally unattractive risks with fewer 
insuring options other than higher premiums. Hence, restrictive 
underwriting in the search for lower reinsurance costs can be seen as 
having the capacity to self-support segmentation through beneficial 
reinsurance rates. To the extent that reinsurance was the "but for" cause of 
this segmentation and increased costs for certain classes of risks, 
reinsurance is acting as a regulator of insurance rates and should certainly 
come within governmental regulatory review. 
It would be extremely interesting to identify empirically whether 
certain state actions, such as prohibiting coverage refusals to certain classes 
of policyholders in their state results in an initial spike in the cost of 
reinsurance for the reinsureds who must extend their underwriting in 
conformity with those new mandates. Likewise, it would be very 
interesting to determine how long, if at all, such a spike continued to exist 
and whether a new underwriting requirement became sufficiently common 
that the effect disappeared. 
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iv. Reinsurance Clauses, Doctrines and Their Effect on 
ClaimsHandling 
As with underwriting165 , reinsurance has the capacity to influence 
the activities of reinsureds, or those seeking to become reinsureds, attitudes 
and actions in the claims handling process. Because of the manner in 
which the reinsured's good faith obligation 66 has been interpreted by 
courts so as to offer the reinsurer a defense to its indemnity obligations, the 
proper handling of a potentially reinsurable claim is likely paramount to 
any prudent reinsured. Even though, as described below, the claims 
handling would have to be so poor to constitute some form of "negligence" 
to succeed as a defense, the risk of lost reinsurance funds is no small 
matter. Further, given the fact that claims handling processes and 
"philosophy" are reviewed as part of reinsurers decision to reinsure (just 
as with underwriting), adoption of formalized claims handling processes 
which would assure compliance with the reinsurance "non-negligent" 
claims handling standard is not unlikely. As we will see, the actions which 
a court might construe as "negligent" handling and investigation of a claim 
are neither necessarily intuitive nor without cost. 
v. Duty of Good Faith in Claims Handling and Court 
Interpretation 
In order to understand how the courts became arbiters of insurance 
claims handling sufficiency requires some explanation of a few new 
reinsurance doctrines and clauses - particularly the loss settlements or 
follow the fortunes doctrine. 167 Again, a key point to remember is that the 
165 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 57 (noting 
the term 'underwriting capacity' means "[t]he maximum amount of money an 
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a 
given period. The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be 
imposed by law or regulatory authority."). 
166 See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., Ltd., 9 F. 
Supp. 2d 49, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1998), affd, 217 F.3d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Compagnie De Reassurance D'Ile de Fr., et al., v. New England Reins. Corp., et 
al., 57 F.3d 56, 88 (1st Cir. 1995), cert denied,516 U.S. 1009 (1995). 
167 See William C. Hoffman, Common Law of Reinsurance Loss Settlement 
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Rule Enforcing the Reinsurer's 
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duty of good faith is mutual and has been interpreted to create a powerful 
judicially-supported standard of care when examining the insurer's 
performance of its claims handling function.
168 
Most reinsurance agreements requires the reinsurer to "follow the 
fortunes" or "follow the settlements" of its reinsureds. These obligations 
are somewhat intuitively understandably necessary so as to allow the 
proper functioning of reinsurance.1 69 In short, the "follow the fortunes" 
doctrine170 obligates a reinsurer to follow the underwriting fortunes of its 
Contractual Obligation to Indemnify the Reinsured for Settlements, 28 TORT & 
INS. L. J. 659, 659-60 (1992) (offering an expansive analysis of the reinsurance 
loss settlement clause and the application of the duty of utmost good faith). 
168 See PLrrr, supra note 9, at § 9:17 ("Duties of good faith and fair dealing 
run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial 
insured and his or her insurer."). 
169 These doctrines are often conjoined in court decisions leading to certain 
amount of confusion in their analysis. See e.g., Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac Employers 
Ins. Co., v. Home Ins. Co., 991 P.2d 638, 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). This 
problem has been noted by both courts and commentators. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that 
"[t]he term 'follow the fortunes" has been used imprecisely to describe the 
reinsurer's duty to follow the claims adjustment decisions of the ceding company, 
thereby giving rise to some ambiguity as to its meaning. 'Follow the fortunes' 
more accurately describes the obligation to follow the reinsured's underwriting 
fortunes, whereas 'follow the settlements' refers to the duty to follow the actions of 
the cedent in adjusting and settling claims."). 
170 There is considerable debate as to whether there truly exists a "follow-the-
fortunes" or "follow the settlements" doctrine in the absence of a "follow-the 
fortunes" clause. Some treatises and courts identify a "doctrine". See PLrrr,supra 
note 9, at § 9:17 ("reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured's good faith 
decision to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the 'follow the settlements' 
doctrine") (discussing ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878 
(8th Cir. 2002) (the follow the fortunes "doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted 
in good faith in handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the 
claims, the reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent"). 
Other commentators are explicit that in the absence of a general loss settlement or 
other "follow-the fortunes clause" the nature of reinsurance as an indemnity 
contract prohibits an implied-in-law obligation to reinsure a loss settlement unless 
the reinsured can prove actual -as opposed to a good faith belief of- liability. See 
Hoffman, supranote 174, at 679. The courts are aware of the split authority on the 
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reinsured and pay its share of a loss sustained by its reinsured,"' according 
to the terms of the reinsurance contract.172 This clause obligates a reinsurer 
to indemnify its reinsured for its good faith payment of all claims that 
arguably fall within the scope of the agreement - no "second guessing" 
allowed.173  Likewise, a "follow the settlements" clause requires 
matter. For example, in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 
1328, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court, when finding in favor of the reinsured 
Aetna, stated: 
Under Aetna's theory, it is the settled custom and practice in the 
reinsurance industry that reinsurers follow settlements entered into 
between a ceding company and its insured, as long as the settlements are 
made in good faith after a reasonable investigation and do not involve ex 
gratia payments. Essentially, Aetna maintains that a reinsurer's 
undertaking to follow the ceding company's settlements is implicit in any 
contract of reinsurance, and enforceable even in the absence of an 
explicit loss settlements clause. Home responds that in the absence of a 
loss settlements clause, a reinsurer is not bound by a ceding company's 
settlement of a coverage dispute without the consent of the reinsurer. The 
courtagreeswith Aetna (emphasis added). 
The weight of authority appears to favor Aetna's position, although 
the authorities admittedly do not speak with one voice. For example, 
Gerathewohl opines that the "fundamental follow-the-fortunes principle" 
generally applies irrespective of whether it is expressed in the contract of 
reinsurance, i.e., in a loss settlement clause. 
171 A reinsurer is not, however, required to pay losses "squarely outside" the 
scope of the ceding insurers coverage. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supranote 10 
at § 16.01[a], at 1013. 
172 See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 413 F.3d 12, 
1231 (1st Cir. 2005). The reinsurer cannot, however, be found liable for an 
amount in excess of the reinsurance limit of liability stated in the agreement. See 
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 
1993). This includes the reinsurer's liability for "expenses" as well as for the 
amount of the actual loss. See Excess Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 882 
N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (N.Y. 2004) (finding that a reinsurers obligation for expenses 
incurred while handling a loss is capped by the limit of liability in a facultative 
agreement regardless of the presence of a "follow the fortunes" clause). 
173See N. River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995) 
("'Follow the fortunes' clauses prevent reinsurers from second guessing good-faith 
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indemnification of the reinsured for good faith settlement decisions. 
174 
Such broad grants of power by the reinsurer to the discretion of its 
reinsured is seen by the courts to require the insurer to comport with a 
standard of care appropriate to that level of reliance and in accordance with 
its good faith obligation. In its application, a reinsurer will only be bound 
by a reinsured's claims decision if the reinsured's decision was made in 
conformance with judicially created criteria for identifying insurer good 
faith .175 Specifically, the claims decision must have been made after a 
"reasonable, businesslike investigation" into the propriety of the claim 
settlements and obtaining de novo review ofjudgments of the reinsured's liability 
to its insured."). This standard, however, is not always completely clear in its 
application. See JERRY, supranote 9, at § 142[e], at 1061-62 ("The usual role of 
the reinsurer is to 'follow the fortunes' of the primary insurer as if the reinsurer 
were a party to the original insurance. Some courts insist that the reinsurance 
agreement have appropriate language placing this obligation on the reinsurer, while 
others presume that the reinsurer's obligations follow the form (although in most 
certificates 'follow the form' language will be found). As the phrase suggests, the 
idea is that the reinsurer is to accept whatever settlements the primary insurer 
makes and participate and pay according to the reinsurance agreement the 
appropriate share of whatever judgments are entered that trigger the primary 
insurer's liability. Difficulties can arise in determining exactly what 'fortunes' the 
reinsurer agreed to 'follow,' in that the reinsurer's obligation to participate in 
whatever payments the primary insurer makes is not unlimited."). 
174 In general, "[w]hen the reinsurance agreement contains a 'follow the 
settlements' provision, the reinsurer will be bound by the settlement or 
compromise agreed by the cedent unless it can meet its burden of proving either 
that settlement was dishonestly arrived at, or that the reassured has failed to take all 
proper and business-like steps to have the amount of loss fairly and carefully 
ascertained." OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, at § 16.01[b], at 1020. 
Unsurprisingly, there is some muddling of terms as regards the use of the word 
"settlement" in various clause formulae. See e.g. Mentor Ins. Co. (UK), Ltd., v. 
Norges Brannkasse, et al., 996 F.2d 506, 508, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1993) (construing a 
reinsurance policy which provided that it was "subject to all terms, clauses, 
conditions and settlements as original to require reinsurance "payment where 
cedent's good faith payment is at least arguably within the scope of the insurance 
coverage that was reinsured" using a "follow-the-fortunes" analysis.). 
175 See Hoffman, supra note 174, at 692-93 (noting "[d]ishonesty, including 
fraud, bad faith, and collusion, is a universally recognized defense to a loss 
settlement clause"). 
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prior to granting it, 76 and where there was a "reasonable basis" to 
conclude the underlying claim was covered by the reinsured's 's policy as a 
matter of law.' 77 
Since the obligation of good faith is mutual, the courts allow that 
certain circumstances, indicative of a lack of good faith, are sufficient for 
the reinsurer to be released from its obligation to reinsure. In other words, 
the court seeks a way to make sure the reinsurer is not taken advantage of 
by its reinsured. Particularly in the investigation and handling of the claim, 
in the absence of a reasonable standard, the reinsured could foreseeably 
choose not to investigate the claim properly to the financial detriment of its 
reinsurer. For this reason, the courts require the positive duty of reasonable 
and businesslike investigation of the claim by the cedent company. In 
theory, this likely only further strengthens the already extant interest of the 
reinsured company to be sure it is actually liable for coverage prior to 
payment - another instance where reinsurance supports a public interest by 
incentivizing prudence. In practice however, the availability of a defense 
on these grounds may lead to a reinsured cedent being overcautious in its 
claims review and handling at considerable expense. 
vi. The CaseofSuter v. General Accident Ins. Co. 
One "follow the settlements" case is particularly illuminating of the 
capacity of "poor" claims handling to release the reinsurer from its 
indemnity obligation. In Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co.,178 the court 
focused on claims handling improprieties in its decision to release the 
176 See Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 
93 F.3d 529, 535 (9th Cir. 1996). 
177 See Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Colum. Cas. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d, 251, 
258 (D. Conn. 2000). 
178 Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209 
(D.N.J. July 14, 2006), vacatedby, Goldman v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70406. Though this decision was vacated as a result of 
agreement by the parties prior to hearing by the Third Circuit, for purposes of a 
recent court's analysis of the requirement of reasonable "businesslike" claim 
handling and investigation it is helpful. Instances where a court determines that 
the claims investigation was insufficient are rare, making this case of particular 
value for its findings of fact and reasoning. 
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reinsurer of its obligation arising from the reinsured's settlement. 179 The 
underling case and settlements involved product liability tort claims 
asserted against Pfizer, as the manufacturer of allegedly defective heart-
valves, by patients who had received the potentially defective valves. 
180 
The manufacturer was the original insured which settled claims with the 
consent of Integrity Insurance Company, the original excess insurer which 
sought indemnity from General Accident Insurance Company of America,
8 ' its reinsurer.' 
Interestingly, the "claims handling" improprieties identified in this 
decision were all actually related to the reinsured excess insurer's legal 
acumen and choices made in evaluating and settling the claim. 82 They 
primarily were issues involving the proper acquisition of independent 
coverage counsel and expert medical advice. 183 The court determined that 
failure to seek certain types of legal counsel and take certain investigatory 
steps, given the complexity of the case, constituted "gross negligence". 
I s4 
179 See id., at *77-85 (reviewing the actions of Mr. Reive, the Senior Claims 
Examiner for Integrity Insurance Company, excess insurance company whose 
reinsurance agreement with General Accident Insurance Company was the subject 
ofthe case). 
'"0 Id. at *13-34. 
18l Id.at *8-13 (Pfizer had a classic array of multi-tiered insurance policies in 
place, with the company self-insuring for the first $10 million of liability, followed 
by two primary policies issued by INA, the Insurance Company ofNorth America, 
above which it had umbrella issued by Transit Casualty Company, along with 
excess policies issued by Integrity, the reinsured in this case. Id. The Integrity 
Policies "followed the form" of the Transit umbrella policies, making the policy 
language of the Transit policies the subject of interpretation to determine the scope 
of Integrity's liability. Id.at *10). 
i82 Id.at *34-66 
183 Id. at *81-85. ("for a case of this legal and medical complexity industry 
standards required Integrity to first obtain expert medical advice as to when bodily 
injury actually occurred and to retain its own coverage counsel for an opinion as to 
the appropriate trigger of coverage. The failure to do so ... breached Integrity's 
duty to Generall Accident to make a reasonable, businesslike determination as to 
whether the Shiley Heart valve claims should have been allowed."). 
8
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The court cited the insurer's reliance on another insurer's counsel for its 
appraisal of potential liability as inappropriate.18 5 Likewise, it cited failure 
of the insurer to hire its own medical expert (again it had relied on another 
insurer's expert) to advise on the heart-valves potential for bodily injury 
and a failure of the insurer to keep up to date on the laws of trigger of 
coverage as determinative factors.' 86 Relying on these claims settlement 
investigation failures, the court further determined that the insurer had 
failed "breached its duty to General accident [the reinsurer] to make a 
reasonable, businesslike determination as to whether the [heart valve] 
claims should have been allowed."' 87 The court also found the Pfizer 
claims beyond the scope of Integrity's policies and Integrity's settlement of 
the Pfizer claims to have been so grossly negligent so as to constitute bad-
faith. 18 As such, the reinsurer was freed from its presumptively applicable 
duty to follow the insurer's settlement. 189 
To those familiar with the tort litigation process, this demonstrates 
a privately assumed obligation's effect on the legal process and litigation 
costs. By focusing on the insurer's choice not to hire independent counsel 
or rely on other medical experts as grounds for release from reinsurance 
obligations, even in a case like Suter where such reliance was self-
184Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at 
*84 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006). The court's analysis of the "follow the settlements 
doctrine" requirement that the reinsured's duty to make a reasonable, businesslike 
investigation noted: 
What is a reasonable, businesslike investigation of course must depend on the 
facts of each case. The factual findings support the conclusion that Mr. Reive's 
investigation was anything but reasonable and businesslike. Mr. Reive's 
investigation of the Pfizer claim was superficial, relying as it did on Pfizer's 
position and opinions of Transit's counsel, which were even at times inaccurate. 
The defendant has demonstrated that Mr. Reive did not make the kind of 
reasonable and businesslike investigation that the circumstances required. Id. 
"' Id.at *84-5. 
186Id.at *81-85. 
187 Id.at *85. 
188Id.at *85-86. 
189 id. 
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evidently imprudent, the court explicitly allows the reinsurance contract 
obligation of reasonable investigation to affect the insurer's business 
judgment to save the cost of its own counsel or experts. 190 In effect, this 
type of decision will require the use of coverage counsel by each insurer 
implicated on a sufficiently "complex" claim that may implicate its 
reinsurance. It also has the potential to institutionalize the added cost of 
duplicative legal analysis and investigation of claims where reinsurance is 
implicated. 191 
To be sure, the Suter case, involved a significantly complex area of 
bodily injury law where the opinions of qualified legal and medical experts 
would likely have been sensible. Likewise, the Integrity claims handler 
probably should have kept abreast of legal changes implicating its 
obligations, given that directly relevant decisions had been made. 
However, there is no evidence that Integrity's claims handler had been 
acting collusively with any party, was attempting to perpetrate a fraud, or 
was not subjectively acting in good faith. The importance of the decision is 
in its recognition that the standard of competent and businesslike 
investigation will be one of industry standards, as discerned by the courts. 
It identifies how a generally common business practice can transform into a 
legal obligation. Though the court was not incorrect in identifying that the 
claims handlers ignorance may have been tantamount to malpractice in this 
instance, the decision has the capacity to effect business practices beyond 
the narrow fact situation of the ruling. 
Though the application of the determined standard of care will 
always be fact specific to the situation reviewed for reasonableness, the 
capacity for a standard practice of requiring independent legal experts in 
"complex" cases could easily trickle down to "moderate" cases and then, 
perhaps, to "easy" coverage decisions. Even in cases where there would 
probably be little disagreement as to the likely value of the claims or 
medical evidence of causation, how could an insurer not be expected to 
cover its risk with duplicative legal opinions when the claim implicates its 
190 Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at 
*85-6 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006). 
191 Good faith is a perquisite for application of a reinsurer's indemnity 
obligations. See ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (finding that "doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted in good faith in 
handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the claims 'the 
reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent"'). 
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reinsurance? Regardless where the line is eventually drawn as a matter of 
industry practice, one way or another, the litigation costs will eventually be 
internalized by the obligated insurers and passed to policyholders in the 
form of higher premiums. 
Moreover, as the decision in Suter stems from the universally 
applicable good faith obligation of the insurer to reasonably investigate as a 
predicate to the reinsurer's performance under the reinsuring agreement, 
this duplicative effort could become simple industry practice for most 
claims in an overabundance of caution. 92 Even if there is no reinsurer 
obligated on the particular claim, as discussed above, reinsurers investigate 
and monitor claims handling philosophy. It is possible that an insurer 
thinking about their future interest in reinsurance will take steps to ensure 
their claims handling demonstrates their history of operating in a non-
grossly negligent manner and, if that requires a showing of the consistent 
use of its own independent medical experts and coverage counsel, such 
would likely be undertaken. 
One caveat: it is of course possible that this added duplicative cost 
could be so cost prohibitive the insurer would prefer to simply avoid 
reinsurers and internalize the litigation savings. As described above, the 
benefits of reinsurance, particularly the ability to stabilize profits and 
leverage reserves makes such a choice unlikely. 93 For various reasons, an 
insurer remains aware of the chance it will in future need reinsurance. If 
anything, knowingly producing largely duplicative legal work would 
simply lead insurers to pressure their attorneys to reduce the cost of 
redundant legal services, if it cannot reduce the need to complete the work 
in the first place. Perhaps this accounts for some of the insurance 
industry's interest in creating legal services compensation structures which 
offer opportunities for "bulk rate" services and long-term billing 
agreements. 
192 Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co., 424 F. Supp 2d 781, 784, 788, 792 
(D.N.J. 2006). 
19' REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (noting 
"[i]nsurers often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent 
to the insurance business. These fluctuations result, inpart, from the unique nature 
of insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known 
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these 
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company's overall operating 
results."). 
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C. CONSUMER PROTECTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, BAD 
FAITH AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE 
Since reinsurance is considered a business to business transaction, 
it is subject to significantly less regulatory oversight beyond issues of 
solvency. As described above, however, reinsurance's ability to indirectly 
affect the policyholder though inculcating and rewarding reinsurer-focused 
underwriting decisions and claims handling processes exist and current 
regulatory schemes do not address them. Yet they implicate issues of grave 
public policy. As described below, reinsurance clauses have been held 
valid so as to provide reinsurance for the bringing of a declaratory 
judgment action against the original insured to obviate coverage. Other 
approved clauses even allow for the reinsurance ofjudgments in excess of 
loss resulting from insurer bad faith and clauses which offer reinsurance for 
extracontractual damages arising from a bad faith tort suits. Each of these 
has the capacity to support rather than prohibit unfair insurance practices. 
If for no other reason than the moral hazard of reinsuring tortious conduct. 
As regards declaratory judgments, many reinsurance agreements 
include a clause which states that the agreement covers "all expenses 
,, 194
incurred in the investigation and settlements of claims or suits". Such a 
clause makes sense in relation to the reinsurer's interest in not 
indemnifying claims beyond the scope of the policy they are reinsuring. 
These clauses have been construed to reinsure the cost of declaratory 
judgments brought against the primary insured policyholder to obviate 
coverage. To an extent, it makes sense for the reinsured to seek to lay-off 
these declaratory judgment costs to the reinsurer where much of the benefit 
of the coverage determination would accrue to the reinsurer on the risk. 
However, the availability of such coverage can only incentivize an 
increased use of the declaratory judgment mechanism. In fact, given the 
broad reaching good faith obligation of the reinsured, failure to bring the 
declaratory judgment action could potentially be seen as negligent. 
These clauses are very common and often interpreted broadly.' 95 
Moreover, in the absence of an exclusion, the "standard practice" of the 
industry to allow for such costs can create a sufficient question of fact to 
194 See PLITT, supranote 9, at §9:29. 
195 See Employers Ins. Co. v. American Reins. Co., 256 F. Supp.2d 923, 925-
26 (W.D. Wis. 2003). 
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support an implied modification of the contract sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. 96  Likewise, despite the absence of a 
clause, declaratory judgment costs have been upheld as part of the contract 
as a result of the parties "custom and practice". 19 
Other particularly worrisome reinsurance clauses implicate insurer 
bad faith. For example, one available clause makes reinsurance coverage 
available for judgments in excess of policy limits arising out of the 
reinsured's bad faith failure to settle or defend a claim and another allows 
for reinsurance of bad faith judgments and other extracontractual damages. 
Called "judgment in excess of policy limits" and "extracontractual 
obligations" clauses, these provisions allow insurers to be indemnified for 
their own bad faith actions against their policy holders. 
As reported in Ostrager & Newman's Handbook on Insurance 
Coverage Disputes, a judgment in excess of policy limits clause generally 
provides "in word or substance"198: 
It is agreed that should the ceding insurer become legally obligated 
to pay a loss in excess of policy limits by reason of alleged or actual 
negligence, fraud or bad faith in rejecting an offer of settlement or in the 
defense or trial of any action against an insured, the Reinsurer agrees to 
assume % of said loss [in excess of the ceding insurer's] $ __ 
-retention. l 
These clauses are "relatively widely used and provide[] the 
reinsurer will participate in such excess verdicts but not to exceed the 
reinsurance contract limits" 2° Moreover, there are iterations of this clause 
which explicitly provide for coverage of "punitive damages".20' Other 
courts have found reinsurer's liable for extracontractual damages even in 
196 See Premier Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 
348, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
197 See Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Constitution Reins. Corp., 416 Mass. *839, 
*846 (1994). 
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the absence of such a clause, but where the reinsurance agreement does 
contain the common "follow the fortunes" language. 202 
The second bad faith related clause covering extracontractual 
obligations or ECO's differs from that of the "excess judgments clause" in 
that it directly allows for reinsurance indemnification for tortious insurer 
bad faith awards. 203 Its purpose has been described thusly: 
When an insurance company finds itself on the wrong side of a bad 
faith case, a judgment awarding punitive damages often results and 
theinsurance company must pay the judgment out of its own funds unless it 
has insured itself, through reinsurance programs or other means, against 
punitive damages awards. Many reinsurance agreements have a special 
provision called an extracontractual obligations clause, which typically 
provides that the reinsurer will pay some percentage of the reinsured's 
liability for claims brought against it outside of the terms of underlying 
insurance contracts. It is well understood in the industry that the ECO 
clause is designed to respond to bad faith punitive damages awards against 
the reinsured.2° 
Prior to the creation of ECO clauses, the ability of insurers to lay-
off the costs of their own bad faith actions had been limited to the 
availability of reinsurance for only judgments in excess of policy limits. 
The ECO clause sought to broaden this limitation by extending reinsurance 
for tortious bad faith judgments as well as judgments in excess of policy 
limits. 20 5 ECO clauses offer reinsurance coverage for an insurer's bad faith 
202 Id. (citing Peerless Ins. Co. v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 696, 697 (4th 
Cir. 1958)). 
204 See Larry P. Schiffer & William Bodkin, Caveat Reinsurer: Reinsuring 
PunitiveDamages UnderECO Clauses, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 147 (2001). 
205 Id.at 159. ECO clauses made their first appearance in 1978 in response to 
the desire of primary insurers to secure coverage for the various tort claims that 
had evolved into extracontractual, i.e., bad faith liability. Bad faith liability arises 
separately from the coverage provisions of any underlying insurance policy or 
reinsurance agreement, and results solely from the tortious conduct of an insurer in 
the course of policyholder service or claims handling under the policy. Tortious 
conduct may include: (1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2) 
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations against the 
insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5) unfair marketing 
practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the policy limits; and (7) 
agent misrepresentation or fraud. An extracontractual obligation also may be a 
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liability sounding in tort law, rather than arising from breach of the 
insurance contact. Hence, the reinsurance clause which provides coverage 
for those tortious damages refers to such finding of liability as an 
"extracontractual obligation". Such clauses first began to appear in 1978 as 
actions for tortious bad faith liability -and judgments- began to become 
more commonly accepted. 
It appears obvious that the availability of reinsurance for bad faith 
tortious liability has the capacity to influence reinsured companies claims 
behavior. In fact, it appears to be an obvious moral hazard. A bad faith 
action can be grounded in a whole host of improper insurer activity when 
servicing a policyholder's claim. As one commentator noted, examples of 
bad faith tortious conduct could well include: 
(1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2) 
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations 
against the insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5) 
unfair marketing practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the 
policy limits; and (7) agent misrepresentation or fraud.2 °6 
It seems apparent that so far as there is a regulatory interest in 
preventing bad faith insurer behavior - an interest reflected in both 
statutory and common law - the capacity to reinsure bad faith judgments 
has the capacity to subvert that interest. 
Considering that reinsurance agreements are supported by the 
premiums charged to policyholders, it seems somewhat incongruous to 
allow the cost of insurer's own bad faith judgments to be charged directly 
back to policyholders in their premiums. In fact, it seems to severely 
undermine the integral purpose of bad faith legal actions beyond the 
reinsured's own retention, to allow for them to be reinsurable. 
Clearly, this type of indemnification reduces the deterrent value of 
these actions. There can be little deterrence through litigation and the 
award of damages, tortious or otherwise, if those judgments are 
indemnified by reinsurer's as a matter of course. Granted, reinsurers are 
sensitive to loss histories so too frequent a number of bad faith judgments 
could increase the insurer's costs to reinsure. Still, that market based result 
seems somewhat less than the affect contemplated by legislators who enact 
bad faith statutes and somewhat disjointed from traditional understanding 
of the purpose of the tort system. In any event, these clauses identify yet 
judgment in excess of the limits of an insurance policy, with the insured being 
liable for the excess due to the mishandling of the claim. 
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another possible contractual source of influence on reinsured's claims 
handling behavior. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Reinsurance agreements certainly have the capacity to influence 
insurer behavior. The effect of these agreements and the manner in which 
courts enforce their performance likely leads to the institutionalization of 
systems beyond and not necessarily congruent with many of the 
expectations and avowed purposes of some regulatory activity. 
Insurance is often dubbed an industry affecting the public interest; 
if that is so, then reinsurance should acquire that denomination as well. 
Though silent, operating through private contract alone, it has the capacity 
certainly to influence, if not directly regulate, insuring behavior. To be 
effective, this Essay suggests that regulatory discussions of the insurance 
industry be expanded to recognize the influential capacity of the reinsuring 
industry. To fail to do so is to ignore a fundamental financial influence on 
the entire insurance industry with the likely result that the silent regulator 
will continue to operate below the notice of our sometimes raucous public 
ones. 
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